

CURRENT *History*

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REPORT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

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CURRENT History

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In this issue, seven articles explore the stability and weaknesses of the nations of Southeast Asia. The introductory article analyzes the United States posture in that area and evaluates the importance of Southeast Asia for the United States. According to this specialist, "The primary importance of Southeast Asia . . . is to Southeast Asians."

Southeast Asia: How Important—To Whom?

BY RICHARD BUTWELL

Director, Patterson School of Diplomacy, University of Kentucky

SOUTHEAST ASIA TODAY commands the attention of the leaders and masses of the world as it never has before in its history. More than 350,000 United States fighting men are involved in a highly controversial war in turbulent and truncated Vietnam. The leaders of two great Western nations, Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Charles de Gaulle, last year paid flying visits to the area. And Washington has recently hosted the heads of government of two key Southeast Asian countries, Burma's General Ne Win and Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

The worth of Southeast Asia to the United States—indeed, to the West and to the non-communist countries in general—has only too frequently been assumed, not demonstrated.¹ Accordingly, the reasons given for some aspects of America's unprecedented involve-

ment in the area have a disturbingly unreal quality. The United States seeks the development of democratic political systems in states in which these may not be possible, for example, and to counter threats that sometimes seem more of the mind than of the world—such as Chinese aggression that is never defined or documented.

The primary importance of Southeast Asia, of course, is to Southeast Asians. The resources of Indonesia, for example, may be of considerable potential value to the United States and its allies, and they may be even more important to the communist countries because they represent raw materials to which these nations do not otherwise have sufficient access, such as petroleum in the case of China. But they are, first and foremost, of importance to Indonesia. They are the chief means by which Indonesians can earn the means to obtain the goods and services whereby they hope to build a modern nation. This is a fact that is only too frequently forgotten. Indonesians, communist and otherwise, regard their country's re-

¹ An outstanding example of an attempt to deal systematically with this question is Charles Wolf, Jr.'s, "Some Aspects of the 'Value' of Southeast Asia to the United States," in William Henderson (ed.), *Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy* (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1963), pp. 27-44.

sources as a national asset to be developed in their own interest, not that of others—American or Chinese.

The resources of particular Southeast Asian countries are also of great economic importance to other lands in the same part of the world. The Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia are rice-importing countries and part of the rice they import comes from the mainland Southeast Asian lands of Burma and Thailand. The value of the products of some Southeast Asian countries to their neighbors within the region is often ignored in discussions of the importance of Southeast Asia.² As one example—the fact that South Vietnam has historically been a rice-surplus region and North Vietnam does not grow enough of the grain to feed its population may well be a major economic dynamic underlying the present struggle in that disastrously divided former French colony.

The economic value of Southeast Asia, in short, is unquestionably greater for its own inhabitants than for any country or countries external to the region. Among the latter, however, there are important variations in importance. Japan, Asia's most industrialized country, obtains important raw materials from states in this region—which it conquered, and lost, nearly a generation ago—and sells a steadily growing amount of its manufactured goods in different Southeast Asian markets. Australia, likewise, looks to Southeast Asia as a growing source of primary products and, even more important, as a market for the output of its expanding manufacturing facilities. The prewar economic relationship between Australia and Britain has undergone major modification, chiefly as a result of changes in the Australian economy. This means that Australia, once viewed mainly as a primary producer, increas-

ingly sees its future in terms of the supplier of manufactured goods to nations such as those of neighboring Southeast Asia.

The two major Asian nations which border Southeast Asian countries, China and India, have major economic interests involving this area. India, which is chronically unable to grow enough rice or other foodstuffs to feed its mushrooming population, obtains significant supplies of its favorite food from the rice-surplus mainland Southeast Asian countries. China also imports rice from Southeast Asia, most notably from Burma, and also has growing economic ties with both North Vietnam and Cambodia.³

The view of many Americans and of successive American governments that efforts should be made to minimize relations between China and its southern neighbors may prove to be not only shortsighted but increasingly impossible to implement. Moreover, denial of peaceful economic relations with Southeast Asia could leave the Chinese no alternative but recourse to force.

Although Europe is still an important trading partner of Southeast Asia as a whole and individual European countries are partners of particular Southeast Asian lands, recent years have witnessed more than a modest disruption of traditional trading patterns. The communist countries, the Soviet Union and the East European states as well as China, have important economic ties with some of the Southeast Asian lands. Colonial economies oriented towards individual Western countries have given way to more broadly based economic relationships—even in the case of the United States and the Philippines.

Compared to the interests of some of the previously mentioned countries—for example, China, Japan and India among the Asian countries—the economic importance of Southeast Asia to the United States is minimal. While it cannot be denied that the economic interests of some Americans are served by different dimensions of United States policies towards Southeast Asia, it is still true that Southeast Asia is much more important to many other countries than it is to the United States. There are few

² This is not the same, however, as saying there is a vigorous trade involving the several Southeast Asian countries, which there is not. See Bernard K. Gordon, *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 151.

³ For an interesting treatment of the evolution of Chinese trade and aid policies, see O. Edmund Clubb, *Twentieth Century China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 348.



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SOUTHEAST ASIA TODAY

products which the United States obtains from Southeast Asia that it could not obtain at only modestly greater cost from some other source. All of Southeast Asia, for example, is less vital economically to the United States than South Africa, from which it obtains industrially important diamonds and militarily significant uranium. Nor does the United States sell much to Southeast Asia—compared, that is, to its total sales abroad.⁴ World War II clearly demonstrated the limited extent of American economic dependence upon the resources of Southeast Asia.

The claim that the chief United States interest in Southeast Asia is in denial of its resources to enemy states is one that is often made. It should, however, be noted that

⁴ United States exports to the Philippines—worth about \$360 million annually in recent years—roughly equal its sales to all the rest of Southeast Asia combined. Total United States sales abroad amount to more than \$26 billion.

closer economic relations with Southeast Asia on China's part could be a means towards the establishment of a less belligerent Chinese attitude vis-a-vis the world beyond its borders. The argument is often advanced that trading with China endangers American security, but this view is not substantiated by evidence. This claim is illustrative of the many myths that stand in the way of a more intelligent American orientation towards increasingly important Southeast Asia.

MILITARY MYTH & REALITY

Another of these myths is the military significance of Southeast Asia, or parts thereof, to the United States and to other countries—including the various lands of the region themselves. The so-called "domino theory" is such a military myth. This theory postulates such an interlocking relationship among the various countries of Southeast Asia that the fall of one virtually means the fall

of them all. Verification of this view is said to be found in the fact that Japan—starting from Vietnam—conquered the entire area in 1941–1942.

The strategic circumstances of 1941, however, were vastly different from those of today. Weapons technology is the most obvious aspect of this. Possibly even more important, however, is the fact that today's Southeast Asia is self-governing, whereas the region a quarter of a century ago was a series of colonial dependencies (except for always independent Thailand). Today, all of the countries of Southeast Asia have their own armies and, what is more important, something to fight for—their own recently-won independence. There is no evidence whatsoever that any significant group of Southeast Asians, communist or pro-American, wish to be dominated by any other nation.

A number of Americans see the military significance of Southeast Asia in terms of an imminent Chinese expansion southwards that must be stopped. And there surely can be little doubt that China has sought to increase its influence in as many of the Southeast Asian states as possible. But there are no Chinese soldiers fighting on the soil of any Southeast Asian country today, and there is no evidence that the Chinese are about to engage in any outright aggression. This does not mean that the world must not continue to watch China in order to anticipate any aggressive intentions. But it does mean that the often officially advanced claim that the United States is fighting in Vietnam today to contain Chinese communism is very difficult to substantiate. Americans may fear China and, because of this fear, may be involved in Vietnam. But the Vietnamese communists began the struggle to gain control of their country long before Chairman Mao Tse-tung came to power in China and even today assert their independence of Peking whenever possible.

Militarily, what happens in Southeast Asia is of much greater importance to China than to the United States. The Chinese greeted United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' attempt, in the late 1950's, to make

Laos an "anti-communist bastion" with the same enthusiasm with which the United States welcomed the installation of Soviet-supplied missiles in Premier Fidel Castro's Cuba a few years later. After all, the record of the last 100 years is one of Western and Japanese invasions of China—not the reverse. The French established themselves in Vietnam in the second half of the nineteenth century in pursuit of a backdoor to China, a fact which the Chinese have not forgotten.

A communist victory in Vietnam would probably not mark the beginning of a Chinese assault against the remaining countries of Southeast Asia, as suggested by the domino theory. However, if Vietnam were to fall to the communists, meaning the Vietnamese communists, at least two countries—Laos and Cambodia—would be in appreciably greater danger than they are today. The Vietnamese communists have, in fact, already invaded Laos. This invasion began as long ago as the early 1950's when the French still ruled all of what used to be called Indochina. And, today, there may be as many as 3,000 Vietnamese communists in Laos fighting alongside the pro-communist Pathet Lao in a civil war that receives less attention than it warrants only because of the much bigger war in adjacent Vietnam.

A communist victory in Vietnam would endanger Laos and Cambodia because the Vietnamese communists wish to rule all of Indochina just as the French used to do—just as the Indonesians felt they had to rule all of the former Dutch East Indies, even though the Papuans of Western New Guinea were not ethnically related to them and had not been part of Indonesia before the Netherlands established its longtime colony in Southeast Asia.

As for the other states of Southeast Asia, there is no evidence that a Vietnam governed by Ho Chi Minh or his successors would seek to act aggressively against them. There is much more reason for Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia to fear Thai aggression, given Thai seizure of Cambodian territory during World War II, than for the Philippines to assume that a communist Viet-

nam would pursue a hostile policy towards it. As for Indonesia, it is Southeast Asia's largest state, embracing half its population and area (if the intervening seas are included); it has in fact more than three times as many people as both Vietnams combined. Given the comparative size of the two countries and the major body of water that separates them, it is impossible to see how Vietnamese communists could threaten Indonesia at any early date.

This is not to say that there is no external communist danger to the several noncommunist states of Southeast Asia—although the internal danger is probably much greater. It is to assert, however, that the widely propounded domino theory is lacking in supporting evidence—whether in terms of the intentions of either Vietnam or China (including the known nature of the relationship between them) or of the geomilitary nature of Southeast Asia. To predicate policy on such an indefensible conceptual basis is to run the risk of grossly inappropriate action.

The military importance of Southeast Asia is probably greater for Australia than any other country except China. To Australia, Southeast Asia is the "near north"; indeed, Australia actually embraces territory in Southeast Asia itself—the eastern half of otherwise Indonesian-governed New Guinea. Thus, Australia is part of, as well as adjacent to, Southeast Asia. There would be a significant threat to Australia's future in the eventuality—although it is a most unlikely one—of a wholly hostile Southeast Asia.

The area is also of no little military significance to both Japan and India—less so to the latter probably because of the fact that it is linked by land to the countries to its north and west. For the European states the military significance of Southeast Asia is to be found only in the generally accepted concept of the global indivisibility of peace—or war.

The United States has behaved as if Southeast Asia were of great military importance to it. This is extremely doubtful: the United States was not directly threatened militarily during World War II when the whole area was occupied by a hostile Japan. A major

war may yet ensue between the United States and China, but, if it does, it is difficult to see how—or why—either the United States or China would gain any significant advantage from control or domination of Southeast Asia. Control of Southeast Asia, which is highly unlikely, would hardly enlarge the dimensions of China's emerging missile capability, for example.

Southeast Asia's real military importance to the United States is probably psychological, although it is no less real for this reason. Domination of the Southeast Asian countries would add to China's weight—though how appreciably is not known—in any calculation of the international balance of power. This could have consequences for other nations—such as Australia, for example—and changes in Australian foreign policy (and/or that of Japan) could contribute to a future United States withdrawal from a position of influence in the Far East. But, given China's present internal difficulties and the still modest dimensions of its industrial development, the likelihood of this kind of Chinese threat is hardly an imminent one.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

For the United States, the primary importance of Southeast Asia today is political. The world of which the United States is so much a part is a rapidly changing one—in part because of the impact of the new kinds of states that have come into being since World War II and are growing in importance the world over. These states, on the whole, are unstable entities—and those of Southeast Asia are no exception. Witness, for example, Vietnam (and its costly war), Laos (and its no less divided national territory), Indonesia (and its varying political fortunes), and Burma (and its harsh military rule and many-colored insurgencies). The developing international community must also be termed a highly unstable entity, composed as it is of such constituent parts.

The United States, however, is a status quo—not a revisionist—power. It is the world's most developed and formidable nation and, accordingly, seeks a world of orderly and pre-

dictable change. The United Nations, of which it was the chief architect, is, more than anything else, the international institutionalization of twentieth century American—more broadly, Western—political values and nonrevolutionary ways of conflict resolution. Because the United States is primarily interested in safeguarding the status quo, it hopes to see the Southeast Asian and other lands develop into viable nation-states.

But Southeast Asia is also politically important to the United States in at least one other way. The United States government laid a large amount of its prestige—and credibility—on the line in Vietnam where it tried to encourage the evolution of a democratic regime in the southern half of that divided land. When this policy failed, partly because of the counterresponse of the communists (which the Americans could not control), the United States increasingly pursued a policy of military support for the government it backed until today it is the United States which is really fighting the war against the Vietnamese communists. But the Vietnamese problem is even now still primarily a political one. It is a question of which of two—or more—rival elites shall govern this unnaturally divided land. Increasing numbers of Americans doubt whether this question can be answered by an American military response.⁵ Nevertheless, if the United States disengages from that country in a way that reflects adversely on its strength or faithfulness as an ally, it may suffer a loss of respect in the eyes of some states, though it should be emphasized that this loss would probably only be temporary.

This alleged danger, which figures in much contemporary debate on Vietnam, is in major measure a reflection of American fears. Moreover, it may be more than counter-

balanced by the reaction of other states. The October, 1966, Manila conference was especially interesting in this respect, in terms of the states represented there and those not represented. China, Asia's and the world's most populous state, was not there, of course—being the “real enemy” in Vietnam. But neither were India, Japan, Indonesia, or Pakistan, the next largest (and presumably most important) Asian lands. These countries either oppose American military involvement in Vietnam or have serious reservations about it.⁶ American initiative in ending the Vietnamese War, even on terms which fall short of the United States' initial objectives, would probably earn both the respect and gratitude of these four not unfriendly nations.

If Southeast Asia is important to the United States in its quest for stability and order in a world of unprecedented revolutionary change, it is no less significant to the revisionist powers who seek to reshape the world in their image and to their advantage. And the most important of the revisionist nations—certainly as far as Southeast Asia is concerned—is China. It would seem more to China's advantage, however—although it remains to be seen whether the Chinese themselves realize this—to have cooperative though independent states in Southeast Asia than to conquer the area after the Japanese fashion in World War II. If the Indonesian communists had not moved as they did in the coup that never came off in 1965, thus undercutting Peking's foreign policy in an important way, China and Indonesia might well by this time have established their so-called “Conference of Newly Emergent Forces”—a sort of United Nations of revolutionary nations—in Jakarta. Instead, the pendulum swung dramatically in late 1965 and in 1966, as anti-communists came to power in the wake of the abortive September 30-October 1, 1965, communist coup. Indonesians found an Indonesian answer, however bloody in terms of the number of communists slaughtered, to an Indonesian problem. Or was it that simple? Can it not be argued that the continued presence of the United States in Indonesia for so long a period—and subsequently

⁵ Typical of such doubts are those expressed by the well-known conservative Henry J. Taylor in his column of October 22, 1966, in the *New York World-Tribune-Journal*.

⁶ Indonesia, while seemingly still opposed to the war in Vietnam, nonetheless welcomed the show of unity by the anticommunist nations that met at Manila. See the editorial in the October 31, 1966, *Armed Forces Daily Mail* (Jakarta).

in adjacent parts of Southeast Asia (ie., the Philippines)—served as a symbol of an alternative approach to the policies pursued by President Sukarno?

LESSONS FOR TODAY

Many United States actions and policies would appear in retrospect to have reflected a rationally defensible American concern for Southeast Asia. The object of American economic aid has been to help in the development of strong modernizing economies—as much a political goal as it is an economic one. The effectiveness of this aid, however, is extremely difficult to measure; it may even be impossible to do so at this time. United States aid in the amount of \$800,000,000 to Indonesia before 1965—when Sukarno told the Americans, “To hell with your aid!”—is very difficult to evaluate in terms of accomplishment.⁷ Indonesia's economy today is badly shattered. But could the events that made this so have been predicted?

And what of Thailand and the Philippines—two countries whose economic development compares favorably with the shattered economies of Indonesia and Burma? The United States has generally assisted these countries with both economic and technical assistance. Even in the case of Indonesia, it would be premature to write off the potential beneficial consequences of the large number of Indonesians who trained or educated in the United States or by Americans in Indonesia under the sponsorship of various official programs. And such educational assistance has recently been renewed.

Partly because of the unusual circumstances of the immediate postwar period when the United States and the Soviet Union loomed so large in a world of variously located regional power vacuums, it became second

nature for Americans to believe that they could influence the course of development in diverse lands quite distant from their shores. The recent years have done much to diminish this self-image. The United States cannot run the world, nor is there any reason why it should do so. Unfortunately, this lesson is not yet fully learned—as suggested by the growing involvement of the United States in the Vietnamese War.⁸

If there is a lesson to be learned from these years in which the United States has found itself increasingly involved in Southeast Asia, it is that the United States, though its interest in the area may be legitimate, cannot necessarily decisively influence the internal development of these lands. It can provide help, important help, but it cannot build nations for other peoples or itself modernize other countries' economies or successfully fight wars on behalf of one political elite against an internal rival. This in no way reduces the importance of Southeast Asia to the United States. It does suggest, though, that the task before the United States is a long and gradual one—and much greater than the country's leadership generally assumed a decade and a half ago. It is hoped that the United States will not become so frustrated that it will act precipitously and unwisely in the war still to be concluded in Vietnam or abandon its policies of assistance to the countries of Southeast Asia. This would indeed be a tragedy.

Richard Butwell has lived in Burma and the Philippines. His most recent visit to Southeast Asia was made during the summer of 1966. Mr. Butwell is the author of many books on Asian affairs, among them—*South-east Asia Among the World Powers* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1957), with co-author Amry Vandenbosch, *U Nu of Burma* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), *Southeast Asia Today and Tomorrow* (New York: Praeger, 1964), and most recently *The Changing Face of Southeast Asia* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966)—with co-author Amry Vandenbosch.

⁷ For an evaluation of the United States response to Indonesia's pleas for renewed aid in 1966, see Amry Vandenbosch and the present author's *The Changing Face of Southeast Asia* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966), p. 73.

⁸ An outstanding treatment of the Vietnamese war is Robert Shaplen, *The Lost Revolution* (rev. ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1966). But even this excellent work places too much emphasis on “American shortcomings” (pp. 389–395).

As this observer sees it, "There is . . . a dangerous possibility—unless a real step forward is taken by the United States away from sterile and ambiguous statements immediately contradicted by military action on the ground—that the next level of the Vietnamese War will involve the nuclear superpowers by sheer accident, if not by design."

Vietnam: The Quest for Stability

By BERNARD B. FALL

Professor of International Relations, Howard University

AS THIS WRITER STATED a year ago in *Current History*, "the Second Indochina War seems to grope its way slowly to a Korean-type 'meatgrinder operation' that nobody wants." The events in all of Vietnam during 1966 seem to have confirmed this estimate: the influx of North Vietnamese regulars, and the unabated ability of the National Liberation Front (N.L.F., or in Western parlance, Vietcong) to recruit new manpower, left hostile forces at the unprecedented level of 283,000 men. On the noncommunist side—referred to, in Saigon parlance, as "Free World Forces"—the American buildup exceeded 350,000 at the end of the year and was likely to climb to over a half-million late in 1967.¹ The government of Vietnam had 705,000 men under arms, roughly one-half of whom were South Vietnamese army (A.R.V.N.) regulars, while other foreign contingents—notably the South Koreans (50,000) and the Australians (4,500) and symbolic contributions from New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines—rounded out the picture.

In the military field, the year had seen a

tremendous escalation of aerial bombardment, both in the North and in the South; and a consequent inability on the part of the Vietcong to mount a coordinated offensive—assuming that it had actually had the intention of doing so. Much had been made in Western circles of a possible "monsoon offensive" in the course of which the Vietcong would attempt to cut South Vietnam in two, either in the northernmost part below Hué, or further south around Road 19, between Pleiku and Qui Nhon [see map]. That offensive did not materialize in 1966, but several major Vietcong units, described as being "in fact mere ghost outfits, decimated by battle losses and unfit to fight,"² put in a great deal of heavy defensive fighting at the end of the year. As 1966 turned into 1967, the overall military effort of 1966 had succeeded only in breaking even at a higher plateau: the military collapse of South Vietnam had become impossible and some coastal enclaves—notably around the Marine bases in central Vietnam—had become more secure. But the initial modest target of 2,000 pacified villages (out of a total of 13,211) was not in sight. By mid-September, 1966, only 195 previously Vietcong-held villages had been integrated into the "revolutionary development" program.³

On the negative side, the following points are worth noting: (a) enemy strength went

¹ *The New York Times*, November 9, 1966.

² Joseph Alsop, "Order of Battle," *The Washington Post*, September 30, 1966.

³ The White House, Report to the President by his Special Assistant for Pacification, Robert W. Komer, generally referred to as the *Komer Report*, September 13, 1966, p. 41.

from 106,000 men in January, 1965, to 241,000 men in January, 1966, and to an all-time high of 284,000 men in September, 1966 (it was to decrease to 280,000 later in the year); (b) that strength was achieved in spite of only 50,000 infiltrators from North Vietnam and a 12-month alleged loss rate of 54,000 killed, close to 100,000 wounded and 7,200 prisoners;⁴ (c) the Vietcong in fact succeeded in tightening its vise around the greater Saigon area, sinking merchantmen and warships in the narrow shipping channel and finally shelling downtown Saigon on November 1, 1966, in the midst of the South Vietnamese government's celebration of the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963; (d) the South Vietnamese army desertion rate, which had reached a total of 93,000 "absentees-without-leave" [the word "deserter" implies passing over to the enemy, which most of the time did not occur] in 1965, maintained a roughly equal rate in 1966.

It is clear, however, that none of these points is likely to weigh heavily in the outcome of the military aspects of the war: reinforcements of American troops to the half-million level and beyond, and further widening of the firepower base already deployed will see to that. But a viable political balance is apparently going to be more difficult to achieve.

SOUTHERN POLITICS

The year began with an unfulfilled promise by the Ky government, made on December 8, 1965, to appoint a constitution-drafting committee of 70 to 80 members. But since the Nguyen Cao Ky government seemed particularly weak at that moment, there seemed no

particular hurry among South Vietnamese politicians to commit themselves to such a body.

All this changed, however, with the Honolulu Conference between United States President Lyndon Johnson and Generals Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu (Thieu in his capacity as Vietnamese chief-of-state) on February 6-8, 1966.* By associating himself personally with the South Vietnamese generals, the American President committed the prestige of his office not only to the continued support of the southern regime, but to that of its leaders as well. The follow-up visit to Saigon of Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey with an important suite of experts, in the course of which he declared that the National Liberation Front "was unfit to be part of any [South Vietnamese] government," further reinforced the feeling of the South Vietnamese leaders that they had been personally endorsed by Washington.

The immediate result of this view was a clear-cut "toughening" of the junta toward its internal noncommunist opposition. On March 25, General Ky announced that South Vietnam would be given a new constitution "within two months"—a promise that was, to be sure, not kept—and at the same time he began to take measures to oust General Nguyen Chanh Thi, the popular commander of I Corps in Danang, from his command. Thi had for years been the "stormy petrel" of the Vietnamese army; he was deeply implicated in the rebellion of November 11, 1960, in which the A.R.V.N.'s parachute brigade tried to murder Ngo Dinh Diem.⁵ After residing in exile in neighboring Cambodia until Diem's death three years later, Thi returned to the A.R.V.N. and assumed increasingly important commands, in which he acquired a reputation of being anything but soft on communism and neutralism.⁶ But late in 1965, as Buddhist discontent with the increased devastation of the war began to grow and was eventually matched by similar moves among some Catholic groups, Thi acquired the reputation of being in sympathy with those elements who were in favor of a negotiated settlement of the war. The facts them-

* For the text of the Honolulu Declaration, see *Current History*, April, 1966, pp. 238 ff.

⁴ Alsop, *ibid.*

⁵ Stanley Karnow, "Diem Defeats His Own Best Troops," *The Reporter*, January 19, 1961.

⁶ On March 19, 1965, three South Vietnamese (including Pham Van Huyen, a Catholic who, in Diem's government, had organized the refugee flow from North Vietnam) were expelled across the 17th parallel to North Vietnam for being what the Saigon press called "peacemongers." General Thi presided over the expulsion proceedings, accusing the three of being men who "eat our rice while worshipping Communist ghosts." Cf. *Saigon Post*, March 20, 1965.

selves are far from clear, as no concrete evidence to that effect was ever presented. Another version has it that Thi had become—far more so than the other three corps commanders—a law unto himself in I Corps, which contained the vital American base of Danang and the always fractious university city of Hué. The news of Thi's prospective removal sparked I Corps into overt mutiny late in April, 1966.

When Premier Ky announced on May 7 that he intended to stay in power for "at least another year," the Buddhist leadership in Saigon under Thich Tri Quang joined in appealing to the population for the overthrow of the Thieu-Ky regime. What followed was a show of determination on the part of Ky, with what may well have been the *de facto* cooperation of certain American military commanders before either the United States embassy in Saigon or the administration in Washington had fully evaluated the developing situation. Marine units protected an airlift of loyal A.R.V.N. troops sent to quell Danang's revolt and American artillery kept vital communication points covered until A.R.V.N. troops could take them over. In ten days of bitter street fighting—in the course of which there were at least 800 civilian casualties—Danang was retaken by A.R.V.N. forces on May 24. The fall of Hué on June 10 settled another assiduously-maintained myth: the alleged procommunist leanings of the Buddhist leadership. As Danang agonized, the well-organized and armed students of Hué had ample time to form a temporary alliance with the Vietcong, of the kind which the Hoa-Hao and Cao-Dai sects had maintained with it between 1958 and 1963.⁷ In the end, however, they (and with them the Venerable Tri Quang) opted for the certitude of Saigon detention camps,⁸ in preference to the total chaos of a three-cornered civil war.

⁷ See, for example, U.S. Mission in Saigon, Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office, "A Note on the Vietnamese Sects," May, 1966.

⁸ At the end of 1966, there were between 500 and 3,000 Buddhists awaiting trial.

⁹ Frank N. Trager, *Why Viet Nam?* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 157.

One byproduct of General Ky's victory was that his position was significantly strengthened. Already on May 16, when the Danang battle was going his way, Ky announced that a constituent assembly would be elected on September 11—a date he eventually kept. And on July 13, he brought some civilian ministers into his cabinet, after having appointed (on July 5) a "civilian-military council" of 60 civilian and 20 military members whose powers remained obscure, but whose sentiments became apparent when it voted a motion on August 31 advocating a "counteroffensive north of the 17th parallel," e.g., an invasion of North Vietnam—an opinion repeatedly expressed also by Generals Thieu and Ky.

THE ELECTIONS

The decision to hold elections for a constituent assembly met with a great deal of scepticism in Vietnam as well as abroad. The least critical defenders of American policies in Vietnam found that part of Vietnam's past problems lay in the fact that "Diem was responsible, prematurely [sic], and sincerely . . . for introducing the idea of democracy in his talks and constitutional endeavors."⁹ Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge warned that the forthcoming electoral contest was the first the young nation had experienced (though, in reality, ten other elections had taken place there since 1946); according to Washington reports, Lodge was somewhat wary of the whole idea. But here again, the outsiders had failed to take the full measure of the Saigon junta and its set of advisers.

On June 19, 1966, the first anniversary of the creation of the Ky-Thieu government, the junta promulgated an electoral decree whose ironclad provisions were designed to eliminate all neutralists, procommunists, or other possible opposition elements from the competing slates. In addition, Article 20 of the decree saw to it that even this heavily-screened assembly would be subject to a minority veto: if the government opposed a given article, the assembly had to be able to muster a two-thirds majority (78 votes out of 117) in order to overrule the government's veto. Another

seemingly innocuous provision replaced the absentee ballot by a measure which permitted soldiers to vote *en masse* in the area in which they were stationed—and it was always easy to switch a 1,700-man regiment into a doubtful electoral district, if necessary.

Irregularities occurred: "In Bien Hoa Province near Saigon," reported *The Washington Post* on September 4, 1966, "... there is evidence that one of the candidates is attempting to buy votes with money and, moreover, is being successful." In II Corps, General Vinh Loc, the commander and a prince of Vietnam's former royal family, "instructed local police, army officers and other functionaries to take opponents of the election into custody."¹⁰ And since the Liberation Front in turn announced that it was engaging in a drive to keep people away from voting, the whole election simply turned from a vote on politically meaningful representatives to a numerical competition—whether the Saigon government or the Vietcong could enforce its writ more effectively on more Vietnamese. As a Saigon-based diplomat later put it: "It wasn't a victory for democracy. It was surely a victory for government organization."¹¹

It was indeed, as the official figures revealed. When the polls closed on September 11, a total of 4,274,812 voters were said to have passed through the polling booths—slightly over 80 per cent of the total electorate of 5,288,512 registered voters. The provincial election figures, which the American press failed to publish, were even more surprising: not one province—including the most heavily communist-held areas of the

mountain tribal zone or of the Plain of Reeds or of Camau Peninsula—showed attendance records of less than 72 per cent. Formerly rebellious Hué came in with 87 per cent and Danang with 81 per cent, while Saigon, with its many foreign journalists watching the polls, showed only 74 per cent of those eligible voting.¹²

What is surprising, of course, is that none of the major American news media went through the simple arithmetic which would have shown the apparent inconsistency of these figures. According to the *Komer Report* of September 13, 1966, "it is estimated that secure population had increased to almost 8,300,000, or over 55 per cent of the population [p. 13]." In Vietnam, as in most underdeveloped countries, it can be safely accepted that one-half of the population is below 18 years old. That would, on the basis of the Komer figures, leave about 4.15 million Vietnamese of voting age in government-controlled areas. If 80 per cent of those 4.15 million actually *did* vote, this would have given a total voting figure of 3.32 million—not 4.2 million.

To be sure, the Diem regime, in an election so badly faked (it took place on September 27, 1963, in the midst of the Buddhist crisis) that most newspapers failed even to mention it, managed to obtain a voting record of 92 per cent of 6.8 million voters.¹³ Only in that sense can it be understood why the *New Yorker's* able Vietnam reporter, Robert Shaplen, while admitting that "a certain amount of exaggeration . . . is widely suspected," claimed that the 1966 election "was still without a doubt the fairest election ever held in South Vietnam."¹⁴

It was considered a good omen that only 20 of the 117 members were from the military (there had been widespread fears of a "khaki [uniform] party" within the assembly), but the assembly suffers from one unsurmountable flaw: in a country in which regional and even village allegiances are paramount, all but 44 of the 117 members lived originally *north of the 17th parallel!*¹⁵ How this escaped the American experts who were heavily involved in the preparation of the elections

¹⁰ *The Washington Post*, September 11, 1966.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, September 13, 1966.

¹² Radio Saigon, September 11, 1966, 1200 GMT (midnight, Saigon time). The incredible rapidity with which the votes were collated and computed in a wartorn country is worthy of note.

¹³ U.S. Operations Mission, Saigon, *Public Administration Bulletin*, No. 8, October 14, 1963.

¹⁴ "Letter from Saigon," *The New Yorker*, October 1, 1966, p. 191.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 193. Shaplen contradicts himself, since he asserts on page 191 that the "majority of those elected are natives of the provinces in which they ran" while two pages further he gives these figures.

—assuming that they thought this to be important—is incomprehensible. And the results were evident when the Ky regime once more drew heavily on its “credit” of American endorsement after the October, 1966, Manila conference by shedding its most responsible “southern” ministers (notably Au Truong Thanh, an excellent economist) and by planning, late in November, the removal of two of the army corps commanders.

At the same time, the assembly, which had let three (of its six) constitution-writing months go by in futile wrangling, decided to take on the junta over Article 20. But everyone knew that this was merely a procedural fight: what was at stake was whether or not the assembly, at present the only holder of a semblance of legitimacy in Saigon, would gain power commensurate with its legitimacy, or would be a democratic adornment for an unreformed military regime. It should perhaps be remembered that, for example, in Laos in 1959, and in Indonesia in 1965, two completely handpicked legislatures turned against their creators and became, for a time, largely free agents. This may well still happen in Saigon—in which case all eventualities—including for the first time meaningful political contacts between the Vietnamese adversaries on the ground—may become possible.

PACIFICATION

If the high-sounding principles of the Honolulu Declaration of February 8, 1966, and of the Manila Communique and Declaration of October 25, 1966,** were to be the gauge of accomplishment in the field of socioeconomic development in Vietnam, then the past year will have proven a regrettable failure.

According to the Manila Communique, “the conference was told of the success of the Government of Vietnam in controlling the inflation” of the past year. Indeed, the runaway inflation of last year, with its 200 per

cent price rises, was checked for a time thanks to a devaluation overdue by at least five years. This was “paid” for in part (and vitiated, of course) by the establishment, with American gold, of a free gold market in Saigon in the midst of a war, a luxury which even the United States, with its incredible prosperity, has not been able to afford since 1933. In any case, by the time of the Manila conference, there had been two inflationary spurts of about 15 per cent each in two weeks in September and October. As a perceptive observer was to note,

the inflation mounts and the economy pulls away from its old moorings on the uneven tide of new money. . . . The planners put their faith in pacification. [But] USAID still clings to its original brief for rural development as it teeters between its horror of overinvolvement and its fear of ineffectuality.¹⁶

One million refugees—mostly due to aerial and artillery bombardment, as former Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman pointed out in congressional testimony—cluttered the coastal enclaves under South Vietnam’s control and received a total of \$11 million in cash aid during the 1966 fiscal year, or an incredibly low \$11 per person yearly. In fact, it was the hapless refugees who accounted for the whole 5 per cent of the population said to have come under government control since last year, in addition to the 50 per cent who already had been under South Vietnam’s control.

“Revolutionary development” (R.D.), as the pacification program is now officially called—it is also referred to as the “other war” in some of the press releases—came into its own in 1966, when 76 59-man R.D. teams were graduated from the cadre school at Vung Tau in May, to be followed by another 38 teams at year’s end. The R.D. teams include specialists in all the skills required in a rural environment; they are also trained in the use of weapons and in psychological warfare and police interrogations. At the core of their activities is a so-called “census grievance” program in the course of which all the inhabitants of every community are to be periodically interrogated in isolation, so



** For excerpts from the Manila Communique, see pp. 48 ff. of this issue.

¹⁶ Frances Fitzgerald, “The Tragedy of Saigon,” *Atlantic Monthly*, December, 1966.

REPUBLIC
of
VIETNAM

LEGEND

Number of "returnees"



that they may feel free to air their "grievances," including what they think of their neighbors' political views. Other programs contemplated have an incredible resemblance to George Orwell's futuristic novel *1984*, since they include the possibility of installing in Saigon a central memory bank which will have on file all the information elements which can be gathered about every Vietnamese citizen, including even his "voice print."

A thorough perusal of the *Komer Report*, which is by far the most complete public record of R.D. accomplishments during the first half of 1966, shows that R.D. has been more successful in the repressive aspects of police work than in physical improvement for the Vietnamese—particularly those of the rural areas. Over a quarter-million tons of fertilizer were distributed to 700,000 farmers for almost 2 million acres (which works out to 0.3 tons per farmer); hog production is said to have grown from 1.7 million in 1963 to 3 million in 1965 (which leaves without explanation the chronic meat shortages and high meat prices in the cities); and off-shore fishing more than doubled, from 165,000 tons in 1959 to around 400,000 tons in fiscal 1966 (the above observations on availability and prices prevail here also). The number of hamlet school teachers reached only 3,800 at the beginning of 1966—one for every four hamlets. An additional 3,400 were trained by September. A brief period of high optimism, encouraged by the President himself in the late summer, was followed by far more pessimistic estimates by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in October, and by somewhat of an innovation in South Vietnam: reports emanating from Vietnamese authorities which were far more pessimistic than those of their American advisers. General Ky suddenly asserted that pacification was lagging behind; and on October 20, 1966, on the eve of the Manila conference, it was Major General Nguyen Duc Thang, the able "super-minister" (he controls several related departments) for revolutionary development, who bluntly stated that "although rural institutions go by the name of 'New Life'

hamlets, the truth of the matter is that they have not provided a new life for the peoples in the hamlets."¹⁷

Indeed, a glance at a map of "returnees" (*Chieu-Hoi*) from the communist side, amply bears out this view. The *only* areas in Vietnam where there have been significant increases in "returnees" are in the areas where American-Korean multidivision operations have literally smothered the opposition: of the total of 9,728 returnees for the first six months of 1966, a full third (3,394) returned to the South Vietnamese side in the two coastal provinces of Binh Dinh and Phu Yen [see map], which had been the object of vast search-and-destroy operations and were under tight military control. The conclusion which seems to have been drawn from this by the military is that "pacification" and ideological competition with the Vietcong have failed and should yield to straightforward saturation with troops, regardless of the short-range costs to Vietnam or to the United States (the latter indirectly in the form of casualties or budgetary burdens). As Ward Just, the careful observer for *The Washington Post* in Vietnam, wrote recently:

... there is now increased certainty that the war effort, despite public homage to "the other war" and the "hearts and minds of the people," is more thoroughly military than ever—and more thoroughly American.

THE ADVERSARY STANDS FAST

On March 8, 1966, columnist Joseph Alsop averred that "Hanoi's current reinforcement of the [Vietcong] is . . . clearly a one-shot proposition—a last high rise in the game." That turned out to be an incorrect view of the situation, but it was shared by many top-level advisers in Washington. By July, the inflow of North Vietnamese regulars and the internal recruitment of Vietcong draftees had reached unprecedented heights.

But the increased bombing in North Vietnam also made the burden heavier to bear in Hanoi. Economically, the five-year plan terminated in 1965 was not followed by a new five-year plan, but simply by a two-year emergency program designed to switch from large-scale industries relying on another

¹⁷ *The New York Times*, October 20, 1966.

efficient large plant for materials and supplies, to highly-dispersed small industrial units capable of carrying on production with the help of local products and primarily for the satisfaction of local needs—just as they had done in the jungle during the eight-year war against the French. The big cities—some of them, contrary to American affirmations, had been badly hit, notably Nam-Dinh, Vinh, and Thanh-Hoa—were rapidly being drained of their excess civilian population. By late 1966, Hanoi had 200,000 inhabitants, out of an original population of almost 800,000.

On July 17, after the bombing raids on the oil storage areas of Haiphong and Hanoi, North Vietnam began to call up its trained reserves, and President Ho Chi Minh warned his people that the “war may last another 5, 10, 20 years or longer. Hanoi, Haiphong and other cities and enterprises may be destroyed, but the Vietnamese people will not be intimidated.”

Nevertheless, the impact of the American air offensive began to make itself felt in the cities. By late September, 1966, Jean Raffaelli, the surprisingly free¹⁸ reporter of *Agence France-Presse* in Hanoi until late in the year, observed food lines in Hanoi and reported that announced food rations were in part not available. The progressive destruction of all surface communications by bombing brought about the influx of 50,000 Chinese railway and road construction personnel and, probably, some Chinese flak*** batteries for the protection of the communication lines they are rebuilding.¹⁹

But the real strategic change which oc-

curred in North Vietnam during the past year, and which reestablished stability at a higher level of escalation, was the massive arrival of Soviet military aid, particularly in the form of antiaircraft artillery and the sophisticated guidance systems necessary to make it highly effective. North Vietnamese flak, as the French and American pilots who flew at Dien Bien Phu can attest,²⁰ was excellent even then. By 1966, it was, in the words of General John P. McConnell, the United States Air Force's chief-of-staff (in re the Hanoi area), “the greatest concentration of antiaircraft weapons that has ever been known in the history of defense of any town or any area in the world.”²¹

But that military point, while important, was not crucial. What makes it so is the fact that it brings closer to reality the possibility of an *American-Russian confrontation at a level of danger* (since Russian flak already is killing American pilots, and American flak interdiction surely kills Russian guidance, gun or missile crews working alongside with the North Vietnamese) *perhaps exceeding that of the 1962 Cuban confrontation*. Such side-effect agreements as the Russian-American accord to fly tourists from New York to Moscow, and vice versa, have about as much political influence as the German-Russian economic accords of 1939–1941 (they were scrupulously carried out to the last day) on the outbreak of the German-Russian war. On October 17, 1966, the Warsaw Pact mem-

(Continued on page 51)

*** *Flak*, a German abbreviation for *Fliegerabwehrkanone* (antiaircraft gun), has become a standard international expression for that type of ordnance.

¹⁸ In an interview while on vacation in Paris, Raffaelli stated that North Vietnam observed a strict internal censorship but did not tamper with his outgoing press reports.

¹⁹ *The Washington Post*, November 13, 1966.

²⁰ See the author's *Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu* (New York and Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967).

²¹ Sam Butz, “Our Pilots Call Hanoi ‘Dodge City,’” *The New York Times Magazine*, October 16, 1966. Butz is the technical editor of *U.S. Air Force & Digest*.

Bernard B. Fall has been an eyewitness observer of events in Vietnam for many years; and is spending 1967 there on a Guggenheim Fellowship. Mr. Fall is the author of numerous articles and books on Indochina, including *Two Vietnams: A Political and Military History* (2d edition; New York: Praeger, 1966), *Vietnam Witness: 1953–66* (New York: Praeger, 1966) and the forthcoming *Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967).

Exploring United States relations with Thailand, this author notes that one consequence of this relationship is, "... that critics will continue to feel justified in branding Thailand as a military dictatorship, and for that reason an uncertain partner for the United States." On the other hand "... the present and next generation of Thai leaders seem well aware ... that only the United States stands in the way of Chinese ambitions for Southeast Asia."

Thailand: Its Meaning for the U. S.

By BERNARD K. GORDON

Professor of Political Science, The George Washington University

THAILAND IS ESPECIALLY MEANINGFUL to Americans today in at least three important ways. First, for several years Thailand has allowed the United States to develop a number of air bases on Thai soil; from these a large number of missions fly regularly into Vietnam and Laos. Second, Thailand is itself the target of increasing Peking-supported subversion and, to the extent that Americans want to prevent further expansion of China's influence, the possibility of a "new Vietnam" adds to the urgency of our interest in a stable and independent Thailand. Third, Thailand has begun to play a very effective role in Southeast Asia's international politics, especially as a key promoter of "regional cooperation." This is particularly important to American leaders who see in Asian regionalism an important way to help small and weak Southeast Asian nations build an effective barrier against a resurgent China. In this article each of these aspects will be considered separately, in order to provide a background against which all other aspects of Thai-United States relations can be judged.

I. THAI BASES AND AMERICAN AID


Despite the fact that there are perhaps 30,000 American servicemen based in Thai-

land, there are no American bases there as such. Legally, and in formal terms, there is no equivalent in Thailand of the British naval and air bases in Singapore and Malaysia, or of the American installations in the Philippines at Clark Field and Subic Bay. Thailand is the only nation in Southeast Asia never to have been colonized by the West, and its leaders insist that it remain that way. Thus, Sattahip, an extremely large base complex now being established on the Gulf of Siam (which some reports say will cost one-half billion American dollars¹) will fly Thai flags and be guarded by Thai sentries. This has been the practice up to now for the other installations in Thailand, although they are used overwhelmingly for United States purposes and were of course built with American funds. Early in 1966, for example, when *Stars and Stripes* announced that the American flag would fly over these bases, there was a quick denial. It was made clear that only for special ceremonies would the American flag fly, "when the Thai and United States flags both flew."²

This insistence on the "guest" nature of the American military presence is in keeping with Thailand's traditional wariness of foreigners, and has certain very modern advantages. For, although Thailand's leaders have increasingly committed their nation to a close association with the West and the United

¹ *The Washington Post*, August 19, 1966.

² *The New York Times*, July 7, 1966.



MILITARY BASES IN THAILAND*

States ever since the establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, their insistence on Thai sovereignty helps maintain ultimate flexibility regarding the bases. Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia, for example, and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, have often had to explain that British bases in their states exist "by invitation," and can always be invited out. Nevertheless, they are *foreign* bases, and ardent Asian nationalists—especially Indonesians—have pointed to them as remnants of colonialism. And in

the Philippines, where American bases depend on long-term "leases," a sore point between Manila and Washington has been the Philippines' recent insistence on reducing the term of these leases. The Thais, prudently, are spared these problems. They are also able to say to their own people that Thailand has not allowed infringements on its sovereignty, for the Thai are proud of their free-from-colonization history.

Despite these formalities, however, the extent of the American military buildup in Thailand is impressive, and the emerging geographic pattern is instructive. In brief, the United States has built a "main line" of air bases and supply depots right up through

* This map is based on material prepared by Anne V. Crown, who also assisted in research connected with this article.

Thailand's central Khorat Plateau. This line bisects Thailand from the Gulf of Siam on the south, to the Mekong River border with Laos on the north. The line of bases seems to have followed older rail and road links and, where these have not been sufficient, massive new American road-building programs are under way. The pattern of this development can be seen in the map on page 17.

Starting at the cape south of Bangkok, the chief American-used installations are these: the recently-opened Sattahip naval base; then the Don Muang airfield at Bangkok itself; and then, moving north and east of Bangkok, are the following four: Khorat (known today as Nakhon Ratchasima), Khon Kaen, Nam Phong, and Udon (or Udorn). East of that line, at the Mekong River border with Laos, is the helicopter and air base at Nakorn Phanom, and due south about 150 miles is the base at Ubon. Going back to about 35 miles west of Bangkok is Nakorn Pathom, at which construction on a large base is just beginning. Finally, on a line running northwest of Bangkok are two more installations: the air base at Takhli and, in the far northwest, near Chiang Mai, an electronics installation is under construction. Journalists report that most flights by American jets into Vietnam—perhaps 1,500 missions each week³—originate from Takhli, Khorat, Udorn, and Ubon. Other sources have put the number of missions at a lower figure,⁴ but all agree that the number of airmen and squadrons are on the increase. The Senate Foreign Rela-

tions Committee was told that, during the past year for example, air force personnel in Thailand was reported to have tripled.⁵

These very increases appear to have put a strain on the capacity of already-existing American-Thai facilities, and this helps to explain both the pattern and the magnitude of plans for new American-built airfields and bases. This magnitude is so great—with the development of new port facilities, warehouses, roads and pipelines running right through to the center of Thailand—that the transportation and supply profile of the country seems in process of being reshaped almost overnight. The explanation for the new port being built at Sattahip lies in this increase; Sattahip will have the effect of simply bypassing Bangkok's overcrowded harbor. Khorat, the site of operational missions, training facilities and a large supply complex (the United States army reportedly has prepositioned sufficient supplies there for an infantry brigade),⁶ provides a similar example. This cluster of activities has led to great crowding; Thailand's Air Marshal Kamol Thejatunga announced in October that "to ease the traffic load" the training center at Khorat would be moved to Nakorn Pathom.⁷ There, just west of Bangkok, construction has recently begun on an airfield and runway almost two miles long.

At Sattahip itself, which will function as a combined naval station and, nearby, an air base, the construction of an exceptionally large supply dump and pier facility is in progress. Though described initially as a naval air station,⁸ Sattahip may be able to substitute for Bangkok for off-loading the full range of military equipment and manpower. It will include, for example, a marine terminal capable of berthing up to seven ships simultaneously, numerous ammunition-storage bunkers, and fuel pipelines fed from ocean-going tankers. Initially, these pipelines will run to Don Muang airport at Bangkok; ultimately, they may tie into the logistics complex at Khorat and the airfields which reports indicate are being built at Khon Kaen and Nam Phong.⁹ The airfield near Sattahip will have two runways, each more than two miles long

³ *The Washington Post*, August 19, 1966.

⁴ *Time* reports that "more than 125 missions daily—80% of all the U.S. bombing of North Viet Nam originates in Thailand," May 27, 1966, p. 34.

⁵ *The New York Times*, September 21, 1966.

⁶ *The Washington Post*, August 19, 1966. Khorat (or Korat) is also known as Nakhon Ratchasima. One year earlier it was reported that this command would stock equipment for United States Army forces of brigade size, but would be organized to support "several divisions," (*The Washington Post*, June 29, 1965).

⁷ *The Washington Post*, October 22, 1966.

⁸ *The New York Times*, November 17, 1965, announcing an agreement between the two countries reached on November 15.

⁹ *The Washington Post*, August 19, 1966. This report also states that a total of 70 ammunition-storage bunkers are planned for Sattahip.

(the first is already open), and will be capable of handling several fighter-bomber squadrons, more than 100 C-123 transports and some KC-135 tankers. This allows for in-flight refueling of B-52 bombers, and some military leaders, according to journalists, have already proposed that the base be used directly by B-52's.¹⁰

These details indicate a large United States military assistance program in Thailand, and the inevitable question must be: how much does all this cost? Exact figures are not readily available and, consequently, estimates for even one project, like Sattahip, vary widely—all the way from \$500 million¹¹ to

\$75 million.¹² Recently, however, it was reported that a construction contract for work at Sattahip had been awarded and that "the project . . . will cost more than \$90 million. . . ."¹³ No doubt this is to be spread out over several years, for the entire United States military assistance program in Thailand has averaged approximately \$40 million annually, although it may total as much as \$60 million in 1967.¹⁴

Over the years—Thailand has been a recipient of United States assistance since an agreement was signed in 1950—a total of perhaps \$850 million has been spent,¹⁵ of which nonmilitary assistance (since 1946) has accounted for about \$403 million.¹⁶ Even with this aid (and much of the nonmilitary aid is spent to build those conditions of development and security which frustrate communism and insurgency) there are signs—as we will see—that patterns found earlier in South Vietnam are being duplicated today in Thailand.

II. THAILAND: PEKING'S NEXT TARGET?

During late 1963 and early 1964, rumors circulated on the Hong Kong money markets that China was using scarce American dollars and other hard currencies to purchase millions of Baht—the Thai currency. It was thought that China planned to finance an expanded subversive effort in Thailand. The rumors seemed to be substantiated in early 1965, when China announced the establishment, with permanent representation in Peking, of a "United Patriotic Front of Thailand" and a "Thailand Independence Movement." Other groups were announced by China soon afterwards (including a "Thai Monks' Group," "Thai Patriotic Youth Organization," and others); in November, 1965, Peking announced the merger of the first two groups.¹⁷

At the same time, reports from Thailand's northeast, traditionally the scene of much banditry, pointed to a marked rise in political terrorism. Assassination of police agents, school teachers and others who represent the government, went up sharply in 1965, according to the Thai government.¹⁸ By early 1966,

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, October 27, 1966. See also *Time*, May 27, 1966. For a denial that B-52's will use Sattahip see *The New York Times*, September 21, 1966.

¹¹ *The Washington Post*, August 19, 1966.

¹² *Time*, May 27, 1966.

¹³ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 6, 1966, p. 9, reporting a contract to the Dillingham Corporation.

¹⁴ *The Washington Post*, November 4, 1966, reported that "while U.S. military commanders in the field wanted about \$70 million," United States Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara favored keeping this figure "close to the \$45 million total for fiscal 1966." *The New York Times* of October 27, however, reported that the fiscal year 1967 figure had been "set tentatively at \$34 million," and that Thai and American officials in Bangkok were pressing "for at least a \$6 million increase. . . ." There is considerable discrepancy in these figures. The most recent reports suggest that a "compromise" was reached among American officials which would result in \$60 million of military aid destined for Thailand in 1967 (*The Christian Science Monitor*, November 5, 1966).

¹⁵ When President Lyndon Johnson visited Thailand recently, the following military aid figures were reported (in millions of dollars) for the years 1961–1966: \$49, \$88, \$71.6, \$42.4, \$38.4, \$44.6 (*The New York Times*, October 30, 1966). For the entire period from 1950–1964, the figure of \$460.1 million is given in Harold A. Hovey, *United States Military Assistance* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 34–35. An excellent article by Charles J. V. Murphy, "Thailand's Fight to the Finish," *Fortune*, October 9, 1965, suggests the total of "about \$850 million" for both military and economic aid (not loans) for the 1950–1965 period.

¹⁶ From figures made available by the Agency for International Development. Marquis Childs, in *The Washington Post*, September 21, 1966, suggests a total of \$477 million.

¹⁷ Harald Munthe-Kaas, "Far From Bangkok," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (May 19, 1966), p. 327.

¹⁸ In November, Police Major General Pote Pekanand reported that a total of 24 such murders had taken place "in recent weeks" (*The New York Times*, November 27, 1965).

the terrorists were themselves announcing that "over 150 reactionary forces" had been "wiped out" in Sakhon Nakhon province and, while this is probably much exaggerated (official sources would admit to just 20 killings for that period), the curve of political murders is rising. By mid-1966, 70 "incidents" were recorded, at least double the number for the last months of 1965, and in marked contrast to 1962—when only two or three political killings were reported to have taken place.¹⁹

Two warnings must immediately be noted. The first is that, for many reasons, reliable figures regarding these "incidents" are not to be had and, second, that it would be misleading to blame all terrorism in northeast Thailand on communists. The people in the northeastern bulge, whose patterns of trade, language, and popular culture tie them to Laos rather than to central Thailand,²⁰ also

are relatively poorer than other Thai, and they have an important history of political separatism and opposition to the central government in Bangkok.²¹

For these reasons, Thai and other observers have for some years been saying that Bangkok should "do something" about the northeast. Especially since 1962, when it became clear that parts of neighboring Laos would probably be in a very close relationship to communist North Vietnam, it has been feared that Thai insurgents could reasonably expect support from outside. This, combined with the poverty of the northeast,²² and its history of social protest and local rebellion, seemed to place the region in an especially vulnerable position. The problem of the northeast is not therefore simply one of communist-instigated subversion, but rather one of present-day communist *exploitation* of a long-standing feature of society and politics in Thailand over the years.

Nevertheless, it is clear that communists, both in China and Vietnam, do support the increasing subversive efforts,²³ which so far have concentrated in four provinces. These are Udon, Sakonnakorn, Ubon, and Nakorn Phanom—regions where American forces are also to be found. Parenthetically, this poses at least two additional problems. First, the visible American presence may support claims that the Thai government has "sold out" to America;²⁴ second, it is more difficult to protect bases when they are located in areas of the northeast subject to terrorism. After one attack on a nearby police station, it was reported that American officers at Udon "do not discount the possibility of a dramatic mortar attack against the base itself."²⁵

The more immediate problem, however, is that the classic pattern of village intimidation is taking place in parts of the northeast where little or no security exists. While there are reportedly no more than 600 to 1,000 armed terrorists at this time, they operate in very mobile groups of often no more than 20 in a terrain that allows them to disappear swiftly. Frequently, because local inhabitants are sympathetic,²⁶ and because of the scarcity of Thai police, they can operate

¹⁹ *The Washington Post*, August 21, 1966.

²⁰ A Lao separatist movement was active in the northeast in the early 1950's, with the aim of linking the northeast provinces to Laos (Munthe-Kaas, *op. cit.*, p. 326).

²¹ For an excellent concise summary on these and related points, see David A. Wilson, "Introductory Comment on Politics and the Northeast," *Asian Survey* (July, 1966). The entire issue should be consulted as well.

²² See Millard F. Long, "Economic Development in Northeast Thailand: Problems and Prospects," in *Asian Survey*, July, 1966. Professor Long estimates that this region, which contains fully one-third of Thailand's approximately 30 million population, generates a rural income only "65% as high as in the other three regions of the country." He also cites Thai government figures estimating 1962 per capita income in the northeast at \$45, "compared with roughly \$100 for the remainder of the country." In addition, as he points out, "over much of the area of the Northeast the soils are sandy, poorly drained and not particularly fertile" (p. 356).

²³ See, for example, the 1966 New Year's Message of the Thailand Patriotic Front, based in Peking, and announced by *Hsinhua*, China's press agency, reported in *The New York Times* of January 16, 1966.

²⁴ Announcing that President Johnson would come to Thailand, the communist-front "Voice of the People of Thailand" added that the President would "order the country-selling Thanom-Prapchat clique to step up suppression of the Thai people. . . ." (Broadcast, October 17, 1966).

²⁵ *The Washington Post*, August 21, 1966.

²⁶ Reports suggest perhaps 10,000 communist sympathizers in the country and between 3,000–5,000 active underground members in the northeast (Munthe-Kaas, *op. cit.*, p. 326).

in some areas with considerable impunity.²⁷ The avowed concern of the Thai government, therefore, has been twofold: to help improve the lot of villagers in the poorest areas and to increase significantly the size and effectiveness of security forces.

With American assistance, Bangkok has initiated a wide range of programs for developing the northeast, among them the "Mobile Development Units," (M.D.U.'s). These are large teams of technicians who provide inoculations, lend teachers, show films and, before they move on, give help in building roads, schools and dispensaries. While these "M.D.U.'s" may sometimes merely "show the flag" upcountry, partly to dispel the well-founded peasant conviction that "government" means only tax-collectors and corrupt policemen, their quick-impact work is to be reinforced by another program, known as Accelerated Rural Development.

²⁷ See the reports in *The New York Times* of July 10, 12, 14, 1966. As an example, the town of Sawandaengin—due east of Udorn—is reportedly one of the least secure areas and government officials are unlikely to stay overnight in nearby villages. In one village, a large group of armed terrorists held a meeting to which villagers came "out of fear or curiosity" and the group's leader displayed American weapons his men had taken from Thai police they had recently killed. "This shows the Government can do nothing to us," he added. (*The New York Times*, July 10, 1966).

²⁸ Harald Munthe-Kaas, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

²⁹ *Time*, May 27, 1966, p. 33.

³⁰ The "Thailand Patriotic Front" has announced, for example, that it will pay \$2,500 for the head of the Nakorn Phanom province director. (*The Washington Post*, August 21, 1966.)

³¹ *The Washington Post*, November 4, 1966. Also see *The New York Times*, November 3, 1966, reporting that McNamara argues that the insurgency is not so great in Thailand that the time needed to organize and train Thai helicopter units—about 15 months—cannot be spared.

³² The Interior Ministry of Thailand announced in 1965 that police forces, with \$4 million in American aid, would be augmented with another 4,000 men (*Christian Science Monitor*, October 22, 1965). Other reports indicate a \$10 million program aimed, it seems, at bringing police forces up to about 50,000 men (*The New York Times*, July 14, 1966 and *The Washington Post*, June 29, 1965).

³³ China appealed on November 2, 1966, for all the people of Thailand to "wipe out U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, the Thanom-Prapath traitor clique, with a people's war." "People's armed forces have been formed both in the northeast and in the south." (New China News Agency, November 2, 1966).

This calls for more permanent teams involved in agricultural demonstration, road-building, irrigation and other projects which are the infrastructure of development.²⁸ According to one report, Thailand hopes to establish "community development projects in 6,700 villages by 1968."²⁹

This task of stimulating development, as Defense Secretary McNamara has put it, is essential to long-term security. In the short run, local security must of course be provided, partly because the efforts of the Thai government to bring rural improvement will themselves attract terrorists. In Vietnam in 1958–1959, and in Thailand today, the prime targets of antigovernment terrorists are the most effective representatives of government: teachers, capable administrators, and so on.³⁰ To protect these people from assassination, and villages from harassment, Thai and American officials today are anxious to augment the size and effectiveness of Thailand's police forces; indeed, a disagreement among American officials centers upon how much *more* security help Thailand needs. The American ambassador is said to have urged "that U.S. helicopter companies should be sent to Thailand to help keep down any insurrection," while Secretary McNamara reportedly has opposed this, arguing that "the U.S. should leave the defense of Thailand to the Thais as much as possible."³¹ Up to now, the United States role has been to train and equip the provincial and border police, and to provide the funds for their expansion,³² but China shows every sign of working to help expand terrorist activities wherever Thai loyalties to Bangkok are weak.³³

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Bernard K. Gordon is chairman of a study group on Southeast Asia at the Research Analysis Corporation. He is a frequent contributor to periodicals and the author of two books, including *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966). Later this year he will be a Fellow at the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research of Johns Hopkins University.

As this specialist sees it, Indonesia's new government faces a familiar, vicious cycle: "endemic political instability can be reduced only through economic austerity, but austerity entails the alienation of the same vested interests that maintain the regime." For this and other reasons, "It remains to be seen whether, in 1967, the quasi-army regime of Indonesia can continue."

Indonesia's Quasi-Military Regime

By FREDERICK BUNNELL

Research Fellow, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University

SHORTLY AFTER 7:00 a.m. on the morning of October 1, 1965, the Jakarta radio broadcast the following statement:

On Thursday, September 30, 1965, a military move took place within the army in the capital city of Djakarta which was aided by troops from other branches of the armed forces. The September 30th Movement which is led by Lt. Col. Untung, Commandant of a battalion of the Tjakrabirawa, the personal bodyguard of President Sukarno, is directed against Generals who were members of the self-styled Council of Generals. A number of Generals have been arrested and important communications media and other vital installations have been placed under the control of the September 30th Movement, while President Sukarno is safe under its protection. Also a number of prominent leaders in society, who had become targets of the action by the Council of Generals, are under the protection of the September 30th Movement.¹

The statement charged the council of generals with plotting a coup with United States Central Intelligence Agency sponsorship against President Sukarno sometime before the October 5 Armed Forces Day celebrations. "It was to prevent such a counterrevolutionary coup that Lieutenant Colonel Untung launched the September 30th Movement which has proved a great success."

By 8:45 p.m. that same evening, another announcement over the Jakarta radio established that the September 30th Movement had failed. Troops under Major General Suharto, commander of the army strategic reserve, had regained control of key Jakarta installations from the handful of army units supporting Untung's plot. Moreover, the commander of the armed forces, General A. H. Nasution, and President Sukarno were both safe and well. What was not announced—and may not have been known at that moment—was that the six "arrested" generals, including the commander of the army, had been murdered.

While confused as to the identity and sponsorship of Untung and his movement, Jakarta's political public was not surprised by news of an attempted coup. For more than two years the delicate balance among the three centers of political power under "Guided Democracy" had been shifting toward a bipolar alignment pitting the president, backed by the Communist Party (P.K.I.), against the army. In the months immediately preceding the Untung coup, this polarization process had accelerated as the president moved decisively to the left. In foreign policy, he had abruptly left the United Nations, intensified his confrontation with Malaysia and proclaimed an anti-American axis with China. In domestic affairs, he had banned the anti-P.K.I., B.P.S. (Sup-

¹ For this and a number of other translated documents relating to the September 30th Movement, see *Indonesia*, Vol. I, No. 1 (April, 1966), pp. 131-203.

porters of Sukarnoism) movement and had approved the purge of the right wing of the Nationalist Party (the P.N.I.). More important, he had publicly supported the P.K.I. demand for an armed militia of peasants and workers in an effort to reduce the armed forces' monopoly of guns. Concurrently, a rapidly worsening economic situation marked by a quadrupling of the price of rice between June 30 and October 1, 1965, severely aggravated the sharpened political hostilities.²

Given this context, most politically aware persons in Jakarta expected a coup—a coup by the army general staff to check the momentum of the joint president-P.K.I. drive toward a coalition government embracing Indonesia's three major political currents of nationalism, religion and communism. And precisely because the president and the P.K.I. were progressing politically, it seemed unlikely that they would risk provoking the army into a slaughter of the still almost weaponless P.K.I. On the other hand, it also seemed credible that, if the P.K.I. believed the president's rumored August illness would prove fatal and if they were convinced that a

council of generals was about to seize power, then in those special desperate circumstances, at least some P.K.I. leaders might abandon their habitual cautious strategy. In short, they might feel they had to move first to forestall the generals by a limited kidnapping operation which President Sukarno would be asked to endorse either before or after the fact.³

COUP AND EPILOGUE

For Jakarta's political-social elite it was no wonder that the question of the authorship of the Untung affair quickly became a closed question. Its perception of precoup politics as revolving exclusively around the escalating P.K.I.-army contest virtually dictated the view of the P.K.I. as the political strategist behind Untung. Moreover, the murder of the socially prominent generals reinforced its previous fears of the P.K.I. and led it inevitably to blame hated political enemies who were also regarded as socially inferior.

Apart from these emotional factors, the army and noncommunist political groups had a clear political motive in establishing the P.K.I.'s responsibility for the abortive coup. As evidenced by the results of the 1957 regional elections, the P.K.I. was not only the strongest party in Central and East Java—which together account for nearly half of Indonesia's 105 million people—but it appeared then and through the early 1960's as probably the strongest national party.

The removal of this formidable competitor thus became the first priority of the army and the religious parties in the postcoup period. Within three days of the coup, they launched a massive campaign calling for the banning of the P.K.I. for its "betrayal of the revolution." This in turn engendered an atmosphere that soon made permissible harassment of any suspected communists or local Chinese who were *ipso facto* assumed to have supported the P.K.I. on instructions from Peking.

By the end of October, this harassment grew into open violence. Triggered by the dispatch into Central Java of the army's crack commando force (the R.P.K.A.D.), the killings spread as the R.P.K.A.D. moved

² For a discussion of the last months of Guided Democracy see Daniel Lev, "Indonesia; The Year of the Coup," *Asian Survey* (February, 1966), pp. 103-110.

³ Some observers who attribute a role to Sukarno claim that he might have sanctioned the "arrest" but not the murder of the generals. The same can be speculated about the P.K.I. The fact that three of the six generals were shot in the process of their kidnapping does, however, suggest that the executors were not concerned to spare the lives of the generals.

As for the crucial question of authorship of the coup, that is likely to remain an open question for some time in academic circles. Judging from the data released by official army sources or available in the trial testimony of coup participants, the case against the P.K.I. is far from established. To date, the critical links between the Untung conspiracy and the P.K.I. have not been proven if judged by any Western rule of evidence. For the most lengthy discussion of the P.K.I.'s alleged role in the coup, see Arthur Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia," *China Quarterly*, No. 25 (January-March, 1966), pp. 144-167. Although marred by many factual errors, Dommen's article is superior in argument to the more recent article by Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Gestapu in Indonesia," *Orbis*, Vol. X, No. 2 (summer, 1966), pp. 458-487. For an alternative view that sees the Untung group acting essentially independently of any political manipulator, see Lucien Rey, "Dossier of the Indonesian Drama," *New Left Review*, No. 36 (March-April, 1966), pp. 26-40.

into East Java and, by mid-November, into Bali. Indiscriminate use of the stigma "communist" meant that many innocent victims were slain. Estimates of the number killed range from 800 thousand to the government's latest "official" figures of between 100 and 200 thousand.⁴

The reasons for the slaughter are complex and unclear. While the chief onus must rest with the army, bands of militant youth—usually Islamic, but in Bali primarily P.N.I.—did much of the killing. Precoup tensions, generated over the land reform question but compounded by deep-seated ideological and social antipathies, are thus basic to any serious explanation.

However, the physical destruction of the P.K.I. organization through the killing or arrest of thousands of its leaders and cadres did not in itself satisfy the political needs of the army and its party allies. To insure the long-term legitimation of this decimation of a political rival, the army needed the sanction of Indonesia's foremost national figure and sole charismatic personality, President Sukarno. Then, politically isolated as never before because of the loss of his most formidable ally, the president, nonetheless, refused to accede to the army's requests. He ignored the demands that he denounce and ban the P.K.I. Confronted with this defiance, the army chose not to force a showdown at that moment. At the turn of the year, the army was still too fearful of the potency of Sukarno's appeal within its own ranks as well as among the masses to risk a confrontation.

Events, however, soon forced a showdown. In mid-December, 1965, in a desperate attempt to bridle the spiraling inflation that worked politically explosive hardship on the

capital's swollen population of 3.5 million, Sukarno's cabinet decreed a currency reform. This caused more confusion than relief. Moreover, decrees raising the price of gasoline and transportation bred new areas of dissatisfaction that culminated in a massive student demonstration on January 10, 1966.

Organized by a federation of student organizations known as KAMI, this demonstration marked the opening of a new phase of expanding student pressure centered in Jakarta against the Sukarno regime. The three student demands for banning the P.K.I., reshuffling the cabinet and reducing prices served to link the pervasive discontent over economic difficulties with a growing political disapproval of the old regime. At this juncture closely linked to the army, KAMI rapidly emerged as the spearhead of giant street demonstrations in support of the three demands.

The army-backed student challenge to Sukarno produced what in retrospect seems to have been a doomed attempt by Sukarno to check the further erosion of his power. Almost frantically, Sukarno, together with Deputy Prime Ministers Subandrio and Chaerul Saleh, sought to rally a counterforce to the army under the banner of a Sukarno front. Even more desperate—and in the end disastrous—was Sukarno's reshuffle of his Dwikora⁵ cabinet on February 24. Although accomplishing his immediate objective, ousting his hated rival General Nasution from his position as minister of defense, Sukarno failed in his ultimate goal of dividing the army's senior officers. Although some officers were reported to have wavered at this critical juncture, there was near unanimity in the decision to demand that Sukarno transfer effective power to General Suharto. The long-averted confrontation had finally occurred. On March 11, 1966, President Sukarno was forced to sign an order making Suharto in effect acting president.

After this decisive Sukarno defeat, the transition to a quasi-military regime moved at an accelerated pace. The erosion of Sukarno's power and prestige proceeded in a more public manner. On March 12, Suharto

⁴ The 800,000 figure is based on actual village investigations conducted by University of Indonesia researchers. See *The Economist*, August 20, 1966. The government estimates appear in Foreign Minister Malik's speech on October 5, 1966, before the World Affairs Council of Northern California in San Francisco, Calif.

⁵ "Dwikora" is an Indonesian acronym referring to two commands issued by Sukarno in May, 1964, to intensify the "Crush Malaysia" confrontation policy. The Dwikora cabinet was installed on September 2, 1964.

used his new authority to issue the long-sought "legal" ban of the P.K.I. On March 18, he ordered the arrest of 15 ministers in Sukarno's Dwikora cabinet. The list included both Subandrio and Saleh. There followed on March 30 the installation of a number of new ministers.

THE NEW ORDER

The most notable of Suharto's selections were Adam Malik as deputy prime minister for political and social affairs as well as foreign minister, and the Sultan of Jogjakarta as deputy prime minister for economic, financial and development affairs. Chosen in part for their reputedly pragmatic approach to Indonesia's problems, both the Sultan and Malik also possessed important political attributes. In a regime faced with continuing unrest in its most populous province of Central Java, the Sultan's ability to command traditional deference in the critical Jogjakarta area was a major asset. However limited his experience in economics, the mere fact that he holds the top economic affairs position should reduce the volume of criticism leveled at the government for what will at best be very slow progress in solving very serious economic problems.

Unlike the Sultan, Malik has no extensive political constituency and accordingly is far more dependent on the army than the Sultan. More important, however, at a time when Indonesia's prestige and credit rating need boosting are Malik's unusual qualifications for the post of foreign minister. At different junctures in his career he has managed to develop excellent personal relations with the governments of Indonesia's three biggest creditors, the Soviet Union, the United States and Japan. Accordingly, in the post-March 11 period, Malik has joined the Sultan in becoming, with General Suharto, one of the most influential voices in the new government.

In their initial policy pronouncements, the Sultan and Malik set the pragmatic tone of

the new regime. The Sultan unveiled the long-concealed dimensions of the economic disarray caused by Guided Democracy. In 1965 alone, the general price index rose by more than 500 per cent, with the price of rice climbing by more than 900 per cent. Meanwhile, the budget deficit swelled to 300 per cent of government revenues. The decline in export earnings from \$750 million in 1961 to \$450 million in 1965 left Indonesia with no foreign exchange reserves with which to pay any of the accumulated debt payments of \$530 million falling due in 1966.⁶

Speaking in his capacity as foreign minister, Malik placed the blame for much of this deterioration on the foreign policy of his predecessor, Subandrio, and thus by implication of Sukarno. Malik pledged to seek a peaceful settlement of the confrontation against Malaysia which he later said had consumed as much as 60 per cent of government expenditures. Equally damaging, he contended, was the president's withdrawal of Indonesia from international bodies like the United Nations and the related cementing of relations with Communist China. These policies cost Indonesia not only the support of Western nations, but the respect of its fellow non-aligned Afro-Asian friends. Prerequisite to any internal economic improvement, then, was the reversal of Sukarno's priorities in favor of genuine nonalignment rooted in a sober calculation of what was best for Indonesia's economy.

Consistent with these pronouncements, the new regime moved rather promptly. Exploratory missions were sent to West Europe and Japan in the spring of 1966 to commence the long negotiations on rescheduling Indonesia's mountainous external debt and win it sorely needed new credits. On the more controversial issue of Malaysia, General Suharto directed Malik to sign an initial agreement on principles of a settlement. The implementation of this June 1 Bangkok Agreement, however, had to await the resolution of still another phase of the ongoing army strategy of undercutting Sukarno.

In late June, the army convened Indonesia's highest legislative body (the M.P.R.S.).

⁶ For these and other official figures, see P.L.K. and H.R.A. "A Survey of Recent Developments," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol. I, No. 4 (June, 1966), pp. 1-35.

Under the 1945 constitution which Sukarno and the army had decreed operative on July 5, 1959, as the foundation for the Guided Democracy political system, the M.P.R.S. possessed the crucial authority to elect the president and vice-president. It also had the power to determine the guidelines of state policy on all matters. Purged of its P.K.I. and leftist P.N.I. members, the decisions of the M.P.R.S. were guaranteed to reflect the preferences of General Suharto.

The most important task of the M.P.R.S. was to legitimize the steps already taken by the army and its ministerial appointees. Fundamentally, this involved validation of the March 11 presidential order effectively transferring power to Suharto and the March 12 Suharto decree banning the Communist Party. In this way, the army finally achieved a measure of the ultimate sanction it had hoped to get from Sukarno himself for the destruction of the P.K.I. and army assumption of ascendant political power.

The army did not, however, content itself with confirming its past actions. While not going so far as the ever-vocal KAMI demanded, the M.P.R.S. deprived Sukarno of the title it had given him three years earlier, the title of president for life. Of greater import, the M.P.R.S. denied Sukarno the power to issue further decrees and designated General Suharto to serve as acting president in the absence of Sukarno. As for state policy, the M.P.R.S. elaborated the directions already spelled out in the earlier statements of Suharto, Malik and the Sultan. Responding to intense pressure from Islamic groups, the M.P.R.S. extended the scope of the new regime's prohibition on the P.K.I. by forbidding the dissemination of Marxist ideology anywhere in Indonesia. Even more significant for future politics was the commitment to hold elections no later than July 5, 1968.

The form of these elections, however, awaited the formulation by parliament of appropriate legislation. In any case, the pledge mirrored Suharto's belief that the army should attempt to reach some accommodation with the political parties.

Following the closing of the M.P.R.S. session, Suharto directed the political bargaining that on July 28 resulted in the installation of the Ampera⁷ cabinet—the first cabinet of the quasi-military regime. Significantly, the president's influence still affected several key positions. It was also noteworthy that of the 24 Ampera ministers, 12 had also held ministerial posts—although often of less significance—in Sukarno's precoup Dwikora cabinet. As for the five chief ministers, four of them had served in some capacity in the Sukarno cabinet. Accordingly, although the Ampera cabinet's formation undoubtedly marked a further transition from what was now termed the Old Order of Guided Democracy dominated by Sukarno to a New Order dominated primarily by the Indonesian army, much continuity was in evidence amid the flurry of change. It should not be forgotten that the army as well as Sukarno had ruled during the Guided Democracy period.⁸

Despite these indications of what KAMI denounced as the persistence of Old Order thinking in the new cabinet, the Ampera leadership of Suharto, Malik and the Sultan again quickened the pace of its efforts to clear the ground for a New Order. The first move—and unquestionably the single most important step yet taken—came on August 11 when the foreign ministers of Malaysia and Indonesia formally signed what was tantamount to a ratification of the earlier Bangkok Agreement. Not only did this settlement relieve Indonesia of an economic burden, but it enabled it to reestablish its place as a responsible leader in Southeast Asian affairs.

The strength of Indonesia's quest for a major role in Southeast Asian affairs became apparent in the flurry of diplomatic activity following the August 11 agreement. Indonesia renewed its cultural relations and initiated talks on a joint defense council with its former enemy, Malaysia, and promised to

⁷ "Ampera" is an Indonesian acronym referring to Sukarno's "Message of the Suffering People," Sukarno's effort to show his concern for the welfare of the masses. In the Suharto period, the term has been used by anti-Sukarno forces to highlight the fact that Sukarno neglected the masses.

⁸ *Indonesia*, Vol. I, No. 2 (October, 1966), pp. 185-222.

assist in the suppression of some 700 allegedly communist dissidents along the Sarawak-Indonesian border. Meanwhile, Indonesia restored trade relations with Singapore in mid-September and thereby ended the costly decision by Sukarno three years before to sever all relations with the traditional entrepot for the processing and servicing of Indonesia's exports. Foreign Minister Malik further demonstrated his interest in the area by exchanging visits with the Thai foreign minister and welcoming to Jakarta the Philippine and Australian foreign ministers. The subsequent clumsy attempt by Malik to portray himself—at Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos' urging—as a potential mediator in the Vietnamese war also reflected Indonesia's interest in the political stability of the area.

Conscious that it dwarfs its neighbors in terms of size, population, natural wealth and military power, Indonesia retains the ambition nurtured by Sukarno to secure leadership status in Southeast Asian affairs. The priority given to that goal today is, however, markedly lower. Moreover, Sukarno's strategy of intimidating his neighbors through a Sino-Indonesian axis has been abandoned in favor of a "good neighbor" policy coupled with open hostility to China—a hostility sharpened by Indonesia's persecution of local Chinese.

INTERNATIONAL MOVES

Following the Malaysian settlement, the chief priority in foreign affairs has been to speed reentry into a number of international bodies previously bolted by Sukarno. By the end of September, 1966, Indonesia had rejoined the United Nations, and had also arranged its reentry into the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These steps in turn greatly influenced the decision of Indonesia's Japanese and Western creditors to postpone collection of its debts until the end of 1967. Although that decision awaited formal ratification at a meeting of the creditors in Paris in December, these same nations have already extended Indonesia new emergency credits of over \$150 million to cover its minimum needs during the second half of 1966. After the December Paris meeting,

further new credits to finance rehabilitation were expected.

Among the Western creditors, the United States has played an energetic, if publicly somewhat restrained, role on Indonesia's behalf. Wary of fostering another client-state relationship in Southeast Asia, Washington responded to the March 11 transfer of power with rather limited credits of \$25 million for rice and cotton. By September, the earlier restraint seemed to dissipate. Additional emergency credits of nearly \$40 million were approved and President Lyndon Johnson made way for allocation of new AID (Agency for International Development) funds to Indonesia by declaring that such aid was in the national interest—a declaration required by the 89th Congress as a reaction to Sukarno's attacks on the United States. Finally, at the end of September, the visit of Foreign Minister Malik did much to develop Washington's confidence in Indonesia, despite Malik's discreet but public objections to United States policy in Vietnam.

Despite the positive reports on Indonesia's debtor standing, uncertainty persisted over the disposition of Indonesia's largest creditor, the Soviet Union. Of Indonesia's total debt of some \$2.35 billion, about \$1 billion was owed to the Soviet Union, principally for arms purchases made in 1961 and 1962 as part of the campaign to liberate West Irian from the Dutch. It is noteworthy, however, that after one postponement the Soviets agreed to an official visit to Moscow by Foreign Minister Malik. The results of that visit were not immediately apparent from the initial sketchy press reports. Moreover, the Soviets had every reason not to publicize any gestures on their part to the new army-dominated regime. This was not because that regime liquidated the once mammoth Indonesian Communist Party, for the P.K.I. by 1965 had become openly hostile to the Soviets and closely allied with China on most questions. What inhibited the Soviets—apart from the prospect of wasting more rubles on an unstable regime in an area of low priority—was the fear of giving credibility to the strident Chinese charges of "Soviet revisionists"

shameless collaboration with Indonesia's fascist military regime."⁹

Even amid these major developments in Indonesia's foreign relations, attention remained focused on its domestic affairs. On the economic side, the creditor nations watched for proof of the new regime's avowed commitment to austerity. In particular, they scrutinized the Suharto government's draft budget during the parliamentary debate in November. The termination of expenditures for the president's prestige projects and for the confrontation with Malaysia would reduce the swollen budget deficit. But real economy would require cutting the two-thirds of the budget devoted to maintaining the bloated government bureaucracy and the armed forces. Although it is estimated that 30 per cent of the bureaucracy could be released without impairing its efficiency, the political risks involved would make the government very reluctant to discharge any personnel. Even less susceptible to reduction is the armed forces budget—particularly that of the 400-thousand-man army.

VESTED MILITARY INTERESTS

The inability of the army to reduce its own budget reflects a common phenomenon in the developing countries. This is the familiar vicious cycle: endemic political instability can be reduced only through economic austerity, but austerity entails the alienation of the same vested interests that maintain the regime. In Indonesia, many officers have a stake in the allocation of funds. First of all, local commanders want to expand their supply of prestigious foreign military equipment or increase the rice rations of their grumbling soldiers. In addition, officers have prospered throughout Guided Democracy as the managers of the approximately \$1 billion worth

of Dutch properties expropriated in 1957. In short, the problem of reducing the military budget becomes the much larger problem of dislodging the army from its position as one of the most firmly entrenched of the economic interests of the old order. The gravity of risking more disaffection either at the level of the foot soldier or the colonel *cum* manager is illuminated by a discussion of the internal stresses plaguing the army.

As Indonesia's largest and most extensive organization, the army faces the continuing challenge of integrating within its membership much of the multiple diversity of the society as a whole—its regional, ethnic, social, political differences. Moreover, because the core divisions in West, Central and East Java have always recruited from within their own provinces, the institutional loyalty of the division often reinforces the primary loyalty to ethnic group and region.

Overlapping, but sometimes cutting across these primary loyalties, is the generational gap dramatized in the birth of the term "Generation of 1966." Coined by KAMI to designate those students and youth who had been too young to fight in the 1945 revolution, but old enough to demonstrate against Sukarno, this term formalized the noticeable generational gap between students of all political persuasions and the older generation whose role in the revolution had led them long ago to call themselves the "Generation of 1945." Manifest in the ranks of the P.N.I. and N.U. (the largest Islamic political party), and within the army, the self-assertion of the younger generation does not correlate with any single political orientation. KAMI students have clashed repeatedly with P.N.I. students, while within the army—especially in Central Java—many officers are feared by Suharto to be firmly loyal to Sukarno. In

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⁹ *Peking Review*, Vol. 9, No. 42 (October 14, 1966), pp. 30-32. Anwar Dharma, the former correspondent of the P.K.I. newspaper in Moscow, was asked to leave the Soviet Union in early September, 1966. He took asylum in Peking, where he was given a ready forum for his denunciation of Soviet collaboration with the Suharto regime. This has involved, among other things, he contends, "the continued shipment of Soviet arms to Indonesia after the September 30 affair."

Frederick Bunnell spent 18 months in Indonesia under a Ford Foundation fellowship during 1964 and 1965. His forthcoming doctoral thesis will deal with Guided Democracy's foreign policy.

In 1966, Malaysia's central government "gave notice that many past attitudes, prejudices and priorities had to be reanalyzed," according to this observer. Consequently, "Malaysia began to undo a number of old relationships, especially its strong historic ties to the United Kingdom."

The Changing World of Malaysia

BY RENÉ PERITZ

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Indiana State University

IN RETROSPECT, 1966 was the year the Federation of Malaysia turned a dangerous corner. Even though the government was able to overcome its most serious crisis—that of Indonesian confrontation—it continued to face a number of complex policy problems: the aftereffects of the small-scale yet bloody imbroglio with Indonesia had to be overcome; the nation's 970-mile-long border in Borneo had to be secured against different types of guerrilla forces; financial support had to be generated for an ambitious national economic scheme designed to uplift the basic living standards of the masses; a dramatic but nevertheless not unexpected constitutional, *qua* political, dispute had to be resolved and, certainly of great local significance, outstanding tensions with Singapore had to be modified.*

In a year of diplomatic maneuver and political agitation, the federation was able to reach some of its goals and solve some problems. Its successes suggested the development of policy guidelines and basic adjustments of old methods for handling disputes, as well as a new orientation in matters it considered of vital national importance. In its handling of

individual events the central government gave notice that many past attitudes, prejudices and priorities had to be reanalyzed. This tendency towards independent action was interestingly phrased by Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in a message to his people. Malaysia, he noted, had come a long way since the days of its creation and "may have to change a little in order to keep pace with the trend of events in the world."¹ By giving notice in word, and subsequently in deed, that it was going to meet problems its own way, Malaysia began to undo a number of old relationships, especially its strong historic ties to the United Kingdom.

The reasons for the need to change and for a new national mood and orientation are clear: Malaysia, forged from the former British Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah, the colony of Singapore and the 11 states of Malaya, had been formed largely as a result of Britain's planned withdrawal from Southeast Asia. And, even though much of the impetus for this nation-building had been Tunku Abdul Rahman's, the actual process of amalgamation—legal and political—had been a joint Anglo-Malayan undertaking.

This political experiment, *per se*, was not uniformly acclaimed by the new state's territorial neighbors. After a period of vacillation, Indonesia decided to denounce the federation as an artificial creation of "imperialism," designed to camouflage continued British colonialism in the area in preparation

* The writer wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the receipt of research grants from the American Philosophical Society, his own Indiana State University and the Non-Western Studies Program of Indiana University which enabled him to spend the summer in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia and to write a series of studies on Asian politics.

¹ *The Malay Mail* (Kuala Lumpur), August 31, 1966.

for a possible *demarche* against Asian nationalism. In support of this thesis, Jakarta pointed to the existence of the huge naval base in Singapore and the auxiliary military nets in Malaya. The Philippines took exception to Malaya's absorption of large sections of North Borneo it considered its own. Singapore, after a period of debate and a national referendum, somewhat ambivalently accepted the concept of a merger, but only after it had secured firm legal safeguards in matters affecting education and the control of labor. The uncertain views of the federation's immediate territorial neighbors did not bode well for the future stability of the country. To many nationalists Malaysia was merely a patchwork of small disparate economic and political units united for a questionable national purpose.

Within the federation, the contending ethnic claims and aspirations of Malaysia's heterogeneous society aroused another set of fears. Many Malays, Chinese, Dyaks, Indians, Muruts, Kadazans and others were suspicious of the benefits of amalgamation. Each of the communal groups, encapsulated for generations within its own culture and tradition, feared the eventual "political" domination of the Malays or the "economic" power of the Chinese or even a combination of the two. Rights and prerogatives were, and are, seen to be in danger; occasionally these fears were translated into direct action, and the ensuing racial disorders dramatized the fragility of the federation.

One form of competition between the Malays and the Chinese reached flash point in 1965 when Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore called for the creation of a "Malaysian Malaysia" in which *all* citizens would have a wide range of political opportunity.² In the eyes of militant Malays, this concept was unrealistic and implied derogation of their legal and civil privileges, if not downright subjugation at the hands of the Chinese. The People's Action Party of Singapore, mindful that over 70 per cent of the island's

population was Chinese and that the Chinese throughout Malaysia—by virtue of their high birth rates—would eventually become the ethnic majority in the federation, kept pressing for a broader spectrum of political rights. After difficulties, including racial riots in Singapore and Penang, Tunku Abdul Rahman conceded, with direct reference to Singapore, that "it does seem completely impossible to arrive at a solution whereby we can hope to pull along together and to work together. . . ."³ Singapore was subsequently separated from the federation.

RESOLVING CONFRONTATION

Even before the breaking away of Singapore, the strains of uniting many diverse people under the leadership of a central government constituted a calculated risk both to Britain and Malaysia. In the federation's view, its outstanding military weakness constituted a standing invitation to dissident states to secede. The prime minister made it plain in numerous public statements that the Singapore case was unique and that Malaysia would exist "forever and ever." While Indonesia's opposition to the federation had initially been political rather than military, it gradually became verbal and outright aggressive. Denunciations were followed by subversion in Sabah and Sarawak, and eventually ill-camouflaged paratroop units landed in the Malayan coastal areas.

In the midst of the rapidly accelerating series of unfriendly troop landings, Malaysia felt constrained to ask for ever greater defense assistance from its allies in the Commonwealth. In addition to the available pool of New Zealand and Australian troops, the United Kingdom reinforced its garrison in the field until a maximum of 50,000 British forces were stationed in Malaya, Singapore or Borneo. The Commonwealth contingents commanded and helped train the Malaysian territorial army. As a result of these cooperative efforts, Malaysia's own capacity to resist confrontation efforts in the military sphere was continuously increasing. A Malaysian deterrent was being created.

Jakarta's reaction to the implementation of

² *Malaysian Mirror* (Singapore), May 29, 1965.

³ *Suara Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur), August 10, 1965.

the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement of 1957 was a sober reassessment of the final price that needed to be paid if confrontation were to result in a full-scale military clash. The Australian and New Zealand newspapers in their respective countries had not failed to publicize the implications for Indonesia of activating the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) pact; similarly, the possibility of SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) participation—via its British and Commonwealth connection—was also a matter to be taken into account.

While the military gamble was apparently working to Indonesia's detriment the political advantage seemed to lie with that nation. Indonesian spokesmen often pointed to Malaysia-United Kingdom links as *prima facie* evidence of the difficulties the "newly emerging forces" had to counter in their thrust towards independence. This view was sympathetically accepted by many Afro-Asian states, and Malaysia found itself excluded from international conferences and congresses. Algeria, for example, refused Malaysia's invitation to exchange diplomatic missions on the grounds that the federation had not lessened its military dependence on the former colonial powers. Indonesia's efforts to discredit Malaysia internationally had many practical consequences, not the least of which was a rude awakening in Malaysia's ministry of external (now foreign) affairs to the fact that Malaysia was being politically isolated by Muslim nations, African states and the "nonaligned" countries.

In these circumstances, Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, officials of the ministry of foreign affairs, parliamentarians, trade union teams, and prominent members

of the ruling Alliance Party began a series of visits to Afro-Asia. New legations and consular offices were opened in Africa and the Middle East.⁴ The political impact of this move to check Indonesian influence in the uncommitted areas was soon forthcoming. As Malaysian views of confrontation became better known, the majority of the courted countries avoided taking a position on the merits of the dispute or on the issue of the British Commonwealth effort in Southeast Asia. Thus, Malaysia learned that its cordial ties with European powers did not weigh heavily in securing votes in the United Nations or in gaining admittance to international professional organizations.

Even before the attempted coup of September 30–October 1, 1965, put a military-civilian junta into effective political power in Jakarta, Indonesian military personnel had been in touch with their Malaysian counterparts and had indicated their receptiveness towards ending the "undeclared war." In a parallel but later move the junta of General Suharto, Foreign Minister Adam Malik and Economics Minister Sultan Hamengkubuwono had approached officials of the State of Singapore indicating that Indonesia was prepared to establish diplomatic ties and resume barter trade. A similar offer to settle outstanding questions through peaceful negotiations was subsequently made to Malaysia.

The Indonesian government's domestic difficulties helped pave the way for a peace settlement, particularly since the rapidly deteriorating economic condition of the country and the rise to prominence of new military and student pressure groups, with a corresponding weakening of Communist Party (P.K.I.) influence, had thrown that nation into the anticommunist camp. A large part of President Suharto's cabinet, responsive to the "new order" that was coming into being in Jakarta, was determined to end hostilities. When direct discussions were started in Bangkok, Thailand, between Razak and Malik on May 30, 1966, there was some risk that differing national aims and interpretations as to the substantive essence of the quarrel would preclude any manner of *musjawarah* (agree-

⁴ Malaysia's 22 chanceries are distributed as follows: two in the Middle East, three in Africa, nine in Asia, five in Europe and three in other parts of the world. In 1965, six diplomatic missions at embassy level were established—five of these in Afro-Asian countries. Whereas Malaysia recognizes 120 different countries, it has refused to extend recognition to the Republic of China, Mongolia, the People's Republic of China, the governments of North Korea, North Vietnam, East Germany and Israel. *Kakitangan Dari Malaysia* (cyclostyled copy dated May, 1966) and information supplied by the Malaysian embassy, Washington, D.C. (October 31, 1966).

ment). Malaysia steadfastly insisted that its origins and continuation as a legal entity were never at issue, especially since the United Nations had ascertained in Borneo that the majority of the people supported its establishment. The Republic of Indonesia, on the other hand, consistently demanded that Borneo's adhesion to the Malaysian federation must be based "upon the will for freedom of the peoples concerned."⁵ Perhaps because these differences had their beginnings in political circumstances, they were glossed over by the accords accepted by both states.

Article I of the Bangkok Agreement did not come to terms with the basic quarrel and might create problems of future interpretation. It stated equivocally that:

The Government of Malaysia, in order to resolve the problems between the two countries arising out of the formation of Malaysia, agrees to afford the people of Sabah and Sarawak, who are directly involved, an opportunity to reaffirm, as soon as practicable, in a free and democratic manner through General Elections, their previous decision about their status in Malaysia.⁶

Since the federation had made its views on secession and dismemberment known, a referendum or plebiscite in Malaysia on Malaysia was not likely to be held. The Bangkok accords, however, infused Malaysian-Indonesian relations with a new sense of partnership.

Among the factors affecting the Malaysia-Indonesia equation in Southeast Asia, none

⁵ *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 1957-1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Penerangan, n.d.), p. 12.

⁶ *Suara Malaysia*, August 18, 1966. There have never been any general elections in Malaysia's Borneo territories. The machinery for holding elections in Sabah has only recently been created: that is, voter lists have been prepared and electoral constituencies demarcated. But even with elections scheduled tentatively for March, 1967, the voter would not choose federal representatives but merely Sabah (state) legislators. Sarawak still maintains a tier system whereby a limited number of enfranchised citizens elect representatives who in turn select, often indirectly, spokesmen to the next highest level. This process culminates in the highest legislative body, the *Council Negri*.

The possibility that the Alliance Party in Sabah and Sarawak might be turned out of office is likely to introduce an additional unstable element in Borneo's explosive politics.

⁷ *Statement On Defense Estimates*, 1966. Part I: The Defense Review, Cmnd 2901, and Part II: Defense Estimates 1966-1967, Cmnd 2902 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966).

has received greater attention in Malaysia than the consequences of British preoccupation with its military responsibilities east of Suez. In an incisive and blunt assessment of its international obligations, the United Kingdom reviewed its defense requirements in February, 1966.⁷ The British "white paper" on the subject contemplates a reduction in defense expenditures for the 1969-1970 period; at the same time, it permits the United Kingdom to maintain a modified posture of strength in Europe and Asia. Given the precarious state of its economy, Britain intends to curtail its financial commitments for future military equipment and to reduce the number of troops actively engaged in the Malaysia region. In order to retain its military effectiveness, Britain is planning a strategic redeployment of forces equipped with select, sophisticated and advanced weapons. The white paper cogently argues that, in an age of nuclear weapons, technical proficiency in the use of complicated weapons systems more than offsets large manpower deficiencies in the field.

The British government allayed Malaysian fears of a premature and sudden withdrawal from advance bases in Asia by giving it to understand that its forces would remain in Malaysia and Singapore as long as they were needed and welcomed. Malaysia, however, has asked the British government some difficult questions about future strategy and has seemingly not received satisfactory answers. This may have accounted for the subsequent rapid deterioration of agreement on many issues between Malaysia and the United Kingdom.

One particularly vexatious security issue that has been raised involves the matter of changing political alignments in Southeast Asia at a time when the international position of Communist China begins to have a greater regional impact. Malaysia has contended that the defense of Malaysia-Singapore is indivisible and that its military development would have to be planned around this premise. The relevant defense clause in the Singapore Separation Agreement of 1965 provides for continual coordination among

all the parties within a Singapore-Malaysia-United Kingdom triangle of multilateral consultation. Singapore, however, has asked for a revision of the 1965 terms so it can be freed from the commitments of the defense council, in which all three countries were represented, in order to obtain "... greater room for maneuvers and [thereby] assist [it] to project a more favorable image abroad as an independent and sovereign country."⁸

Without necessarily overcoming Singapore's sensitivities, Malaysian officials, speaking privately, claim that there are only three courses of action open to them in their immediate quest for security: (1) closer association with certain Commonwealth countries in case of military need; (2) acceptance of American strategic views that Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia form an arc encircling Communist China and, therefore, closer military ties with the United States; (3) cooperation and planning with an anticommunist-oriented Indonesia.

The first course was the most logical and least disruptive of future relationships with Singapore, but involved the distinct disadvantage of dependence on relatively weak nations. The second option could not be considered too seriously since the United States attitude has been that Malaysia is properly "within the sphere of British influence." The last alternative seemed the most immediately realizable. Unlike the social, cultural and economically-centered Association of South-East Asia (A.S.A.), or the politically nebulous new Asian and Pacific Council which convened in South Korea June 1, 1966, Malaysia could easily identify itself with the present goals of its large neighbor.

By early autumn the two "Malay-based"

⁸ Interview with an official in the ministry of foreign affairs (Kuala Lumpur), August 15, 1966.

⁹ Azahari, born in Indonesia and formerly a resident in the British protectorate of Brunei, led an abortive uprising against the ruling authorities in Malaya four years ago. He fled into the jungle with remnants of his Party Ráayat and supplemented his forces with Indonesian volunteers. Sarawak's communists never seemed to cooperate closely with the Azahari forces, although individual Chinese were known to be members of the National Army of North Kalimantan.

¹⁰ See *Suara Malaysia*, September 22, 1966.

states had begun to cooperate in a variety of ventures. Military teams were exchanged by the respective national war colleges; partial agreement was reached in patrolling the common border in Borneo; liaison centers of mixed Indonesian-Malaysian teams were established in Kuching, Pontianak and elsewhere. Members of a Free Malaysian movement were detained in Jakarta by the ruling junta; and the "revolutionary government" of A. M. Azahari⁹ was enjoined from using Indonesian facilities for propaganda or warlike activities. And, finally, Sarawak's Chinese communists were ordered to cease their resistance, leave their bases and return to their communities in Borneo—on this last point it should be noted that Indonesia's control over its Borneo irregulars and volunteers is often no more than nominal.

DISCONTENT IN EAST MALAYSIA

Within Sarawak, the *detente* between Malaysia and Indonesia, embodied in the Bangkok accords, served as a catalyst in precipitating a severe crisis. Chief Minister Dato Stephen Kalong Ningkan, the Dyak leader of the coalition Alliance Party and head of the state government, faced a revolt in the *Council Negri* (the legislature) that was to result in his being ousted from the Alliance as well as from the government. The methods employed in the rejection of his leadership were to lead to bitter recriminations between his own party—the Sarawak National Alliance Party (S.N.A.P.)—and the federal government.¹⁰ The central government in record time introduced in the parliament and secured passage of legislation amending, albeit temporarily, the federal constitution. These amendments vested specific powers in the governor of Sarawak to convene meetings of the *Council Negri* and to dismiss a "Chief Minister who had lost its confidence."

Almost on the heels of this significant move, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia, in his role as chief of state, proclaimed a state of emergency in Sarawak. The reasons given for this drastic action alluded to the dangers of a potential communist uprising in Borneo. These two strong mea-

tures, held by many Sarawakians to be a breach of faith of the original 1963 Malaysia agreements as well as evidence that the central government did not really want elections to take place, produced a strong emotional reaction in the Sarawak press and among the opposition parties in the *Council Negri*. In adjoining Sabah, the powerful United Pasokmomogun Kadazan Organization (U.P.-K.O.), a participating member of the ruling Sabah Alliance, likewise saw in these developments undue pressure from Malaya.

The declaration of emergency, however, had some psychological significance. In June and July, 1966, the Malaysian government showered the very long border areas with surrender leaflets inviting the 700-800 communist guerrilla, principally Chinese, to leave their jungle outposts and start "life afresh." Those who accepted the amnesty terms were assured of safe conduct passage to their homes and families and were offered substantial rewards for turning in their equipment. Unlike earlier Malayan surrender terms, which had led to the final collapse of the communist revolt on the peninsula, the Sarawak leaflets made no mention of waivers from prosecution for those guerrillas who had committed atrocities. Similarly, no repatriation offer was made to those who might have wished to go to Communist China.

The results of this Operation *Harapan* (hope) were deeply disappointing and helped force the government to declare the emergency. After ten weeks of exhortation and patient waiting, less than 20 communists and sympathizers had surrendered. The campaign to get the communists to "surface"—while Indonesia was becoming increasingly sympathetic to Malaysia's anticommunist drive—had reached a dangerous end. Since Jakarta had difficulties in controlling its ele-

ments in Borneo, and Malaysian troops were not permitted to cross the international borders, it became apparent to Malaysia that the communists in Indonesian sanctuaries could become an ever-increasing menace.¹¹

The Borneo security problem was made more difficult by the increasing interest Communist China was showing in encouraging dissident Malaysians to become associated with various "freedom movements." The North Kalimantan National Liberation League (N.K.N.L.L.), which had come into existence in Borneo in the early 1960's, had semi-official contacts in Peking. Communist China also began to revive a very dormant Malayan National Liberation League (M.N.-L.L.) This organization had been of major importance in the guerrilla operations in 1948 in the Malayan jungles but had become increasingly inactive as its leaders were detained, killed or defected from the Malayan Communist Party. The Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, however, resuscitated the M.N.L.L. and placed at its head a former Indian national and long-term Malayan-Singapore resident. The Malaysian security problem was rendered even more complex by an incident on the Thai-Malayan border underscoring the difficulties of containing an enemy intent on hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. A force of the Malayan National Liberation Army ambushed and decimated a Thai-Malaysian patrol in the southern town of Betong, Thailand. This incident, more than any other, exacerbated fears in Kuala Lumpur that communist factions in Sarawak and Malaya might link up and engage the central government while the country was rent by intraparty disputes about the essence and benefits of federation.

ECONOMIC HOPES

Upon conclusion of Malay's second five-year program, the government called for a comprehensive, consolidated scheme for the economic development of the constituent parts of the country. The minister of finance, Tan Siew Sin, envisaged the injection of large amounts of capital to meet the "general expectations" of the peoples of the various

¹¹ The "other" war, of words over northern Borneo, between the Philippines and Malaysia, was halted when both countries affirmed their mutual desire to resume diplomatic contacts despite differences in agreement as to the "ownership" of large parts of Sabah. In a joint communique both the Philippines and Malaysia pledged to clarify their rival claims at some future date. *Siaran Akbar* (Kuala Lumpur), Pen. 1/66/155 (EXAFS); for background to the dispute, see *The Philippines Free Press*, August 20, 1966.

states. According to the prospectus of the First Malaysia Plan, new avenues of employment had to be found for the large numbers of persons coming annually into the labor market. New agricultural and industrial outlets likewise had to be provided if the country were eventually to overcome its reliance on the export of tin and rubber. The final aim of the program was to encourage ever-greater investment in public and private sectors and thereby to stimulate an economic growth to overcome burgeoning population increases. The total anticipated outlay for the years 1966–1970 was estimated to be in the neighborhood of M\$10.5 billion.¹²

Tan Siew Sin had long advocated securing a combination of domestic and international financial support for the program. The publication of the British defense white paper therefore, with its implied reduction of new commitments in Southeast Asia, added urgency to his search for funds. Whereas long-range development projects had been underwritten by local sources, the magnitude of the First Malaysia Plan depended to a great extent on the availability of foreign assistance. The quest for overseas sources was made even more necessary by Malaysia's own defense expenditures and the uncertainty of assured income from the sale of rubber in the world market. Whereas immediate defense allocations in the plan were covered by a combination of taxes, loans secured by public subscriptions, and Commonwealth grants, an additional and significant balance of M\$1.9 billion had to be raised if the plan's goals were to be met.

A group of Commonwealth and European nations, also including the United States and Japan, formed a consultative group on aid to Malaysia to help Malaysia meet its fiscal requirements.¹³ In this context, the United Kingdom was approached and asked for a large contribution on top of its pledged support. Citing its own difficulties, Britain

refused to increase its scale of aid. Malaysians claimed they were led to believe that the United Kingdom would modify its unwillingness to increase its aid if defense treaties between Malaysia and Singapore and the United Kingdom and Singapore were negotiated.

The Malaysian reaction was caustic and bitter. Malaysia held that "Britain was putting the financial squeeze on us in order to force us to come to terms with Singapore in the economic sphere."¹⁴ Moreover, the Malaysian government interpreted this reluctance to help as a British gambit to protect its investments in Southeast Asia while simultaneously improving its hazardous balance-of-payments position by assuring itself of a favorable political situation, both in Malaysia and Singapore. In pique and disappointment at being denied essential assistance, both the finance minister and the prime minister announced that Malaysia ought to lessen its intimate connections with the United Kingdom. This was followed by an announcement that Malaysia was going to remove a selected number of Commonwealth preferential tariffs and open wider its markets to competitive foreign products. The country, Tan Siew Sin explained, would thus save badly needed hard currency while giving notice that it would continue to go ahead with its economic projects.

After the secession of Singapore, its emotional war of words with the federation subsided briefly. However, the lengthy debates in the Malaysian parliament about the defense and economic roles of the United King-

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René Peritz has just returned from a research leave which included visits to Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. From 1962 to 1963, he was a Fulbright Fellow at the University of Singapore, and did some research in the Malaysian territories. He has contributed to several periodicals and is the co-author, with Henry J. Abraham, of the forthcoming *Appointments to the United States Supreme Court: A Reference Guide*.

¹² *First Malaysia Plan 1960–1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printing Office, 1965), *passim*.

¹³ *Parliamentary Debates: Dewan Rdayat—Official Session of the Second Parliament of Malaysia (morning)*, June 16, 1966 (cyclostyled), pp. 12–13.

¹⁴ *Siaran Akhbar*, Pen. 6/66/228 (PARL).

Although this observer points out that "Cambodia has been careful to eschew neutralism," he notes that "The problem Cambodia poses for the West is its vehemently anti-Western neutrality—and this from a country that was a pro-Western neutral only a decade ago."

Cambodian Neutrality

By WILLIAM E. WILLMOTT

Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of British Columbia

VIEWED FROM THE WEST, Cambodia's foreign policy has often seemed contradictory and unpredictable. Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodian head-of-state, launches a verbal attack on the United States one day and says nasty things about the Soviet Union the next. While complaining bitterly of the imperialist intentions of North Vietnam, he has opposed the various anticommunist regimes that have followed each other in South Vietnam. In addition, his statements on Chinese intentions for Southeast Asia have been quoted extensively in our press.¹

In terms of the cold-war global concepts prevalent in North America, these statements do not add up to a consistent policy. In terms of the central issue facing Cambodia, however, Sihanouk's statements appear not only consistent, but well conceived. The central issue is the preservation of the integrity and independence of the Cambodian nation in the face of its much larger neighbors and the world powers who see Southeast Asia as one of the battlefields for their own confrontation.

This issue has been analyzed by an American observer in four categories:

- 1) Cambodia hopes "to avert a confrontation between the cold-war powers on her soil";

¹ See, for instance, the quotation in John Armstrong, *Sihanouk Speaks* (New York: Walker & Co., 1964), p. 123.

² Roger Smith, *Cambodia's Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 87.

- 2) "Cambodia wishes to avoid any relationship with a stronger power which may compromise her independence";
- 3) "She wishes to preserve the sanctity of her borders . . . against . . . the imperialistic ambitions of . . . Thailand and Vietnam";
- 4) "Cambodia would like again to be able to exert some influence upon international events."²

While all four are important, the first three are most cogent in shaping Cambodian policy.

Sihanouk's preoccupation with national integrity can be seen in the persistent struggle he undertook for Cambodian independence from the French. While the independence movements of most other Southeast Asian countries did not gain the sympathy of the indigenous aristocracy (with the exception of Malaya, of course), Cambodia won statehood primarily through the actions of its monarch, Norodom Sihanouk, who spurred a "royal crusade" for independence. His concern, and that of the Khmer elite which supported him, can be understood only in terms of their fear that if the Vietminh were victorious in Vietnam while Cambodia remained under French "protection," it would be dominated by an independent Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh. To avoid this unhappy future, Sihanouk went to great lengths to achieve independence before that imminent victory. At Geneva in 1954 he strongly (and successfully) opposed Vietminh claims for a Cambodian communist representative.

Traditionally, Cambodia has seen its two large neighbors as the main threats to its national integrity. For four centuries, the armies of Thailand (Siam) and Vietnam (Annam) have fought on Cambodian territory; each has exerted suzerainty over Cambodia at various times; and both have occupied large tracts of Cambodian territory, either temporarily or permanently. Throughout pre-French history, conflicts within Cambodia have been exploited by one more powerful neighbor or the other to win further concessions from the Khmer court. From their own history, then, Cambodians believe they have good reason to distrust Thai and Vietnamese intentions.

Nor are these suspicions founded merely on history: Cambodia today suffers continual harassment along both her Thai and Vietnamese borders. In the first five months of 1965 alone, the International Control Commission reported 385 border incidents with South Vietnam, while *The New York Times* reported yet another Thai attack on Cambodian territory on April 27, 1966.³ Such incidents reinforce Cambodian concern for the future of the Khmer nation.

It seems evident that Cambodian foreign policy is guided by the overriding issue of national integrity. Before turning to foreign policy, however, a brief look at internal policy will illustrate how important this issue is for

all aspects of Cambodian politics. For instance, the emphasis upon the throne, at a time when monarchy appears increasingly anachronistic to outside observers, represents an attempt to maintain a unifying symbol to stand above political divisions within the country. Where but in Cambodia would one find a "royal socialist youth" (*Jeunesse Socialiste Royale Khmère*) movement?

Cambodian "Buddhist socialism" can also be understood in this light. The government is faced with the problem of developing a socialist economy without antagonizing groups that might encourage intervention on their behalf. Accordingly, it has carefully avoided expropriation. The nationalization of banking and foreign trade, announced in December, 1963, is an example of this policy: rather than expropriating private firms, the government ordered them to move their capital out of these sectors; they were free to export their capital out of Cambodia altogether—as some did—or to invest it in private industrial production, where it would serve not only their own interests but the interests of national economic development as well.⁴ The five-year plan that begins in 1967 is to move further in this direction, providing for the establishment of an increasing state sector without diminishing the operation or role of private investment in industry.

Cambodia is in a better position than many developing countries in this regard, because agriculture does not present urgent problems. Unlike South Vietnam, Cambodia suffers no problem of landlordism, for 95 per cent of the Khmer peasants own the land they till.⁵ Unlike Java, it suffers no overpopulation problem, for its arable land could maintain twice the current Khmer population without technological advance. It suffers little from drought, for the rains are dependable, and the Great Lake provides an incredible natural system of water conservation, maintaining the water table in the dry season and absorbing the peak floods. The priorities of development in Cambodia's first decade of independence have therefore been placed on education and health, with results that are clearly visible to the peasant.⁶ Now that

³ *The New York Times*, May 5, 1966.

⁴ The results of this policy are already evident in rising figures of industrial capacity. In the year 1963–1964, private investment in industry increased by more than 140 percent, with 380 new privately owned industrial concerns set up. *Kambuja*, Phnom Penh, No. 3 (June 15, 1965), p. 42.

⁵ Jean Delvert, *Le paysan cambodgien* (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1961), p. 501. Delvert reports that in the area he investigated, which involved most of the ricelands of Cambodia, 770,000 of 806,000 peasants owned their own land.

⁶ See statistics on health facilities, *Le Sangkum*, Phnom Penh, No. 12 (July, 1966), p. 39, and in *Kambuja*, No. 4 (July 15, 1965), pp. 68–79. Between 1955 and 1965, hospitals increased from 16 to 36, infirmaries from 100 to 387, midwifery stations from 60 to 518, with even greater increases in medical personnel. Primary schools have increased from 2500 to 3700 in ten years, while secondary schools have gone up from 7 to 87, with corresponding increases in enrollment (*Kambuja*, No. 3, pp. 68–69). See also *Cambodge* (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Information, 1962), pp. 111–131.

the emphasis will be shifted to economic development in the first five-year plan, the government can rely on a backlog of strong support. It will be interesting to see how Buddhist socialism attacks the difficult and universal problem of agricultural productivity.

NONALIGNMENT

On the international scene, Cambodian policy is one of announced neutrality. By this is meant nonalignment, the avoidance of any involvement in the global conflict between power blocs espousing differing ideologies. It does not mean neutralism—the espousing of yet a third ideological position or the alignment with a third bloc in opposition to the other two. Cambodia has been careful to eschew neutralism, for it believes that any alignment will diminish its ability to maneuver in its own interests. Cambodia's rejection of SEATO protection at a time when Sihanouk was strongly oriented toward the West is an example of this neutrality. Its refusal to provide material to the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam at a time when Sihanouk is friendly with China is another.

But neutrality does not imply silence on world affairs. On the contrary, Cambodia's lack of commitment to either side permits Sihanouk to present his views in the frankest terms. The problem Cambodia poses for the West is its vehemently anti-Western neutrality—and this from a country that was a pro-Western neutral only a decade ago. In May, 1955, Cambodia signed a military aid agreement with the United States which gave to the Americans the responsibility of equipping and training the Cambodian armed forces (with some French participation in training). An agreement for economic aid was also signed that year. Although the International Control Commission set up by the Geneva Conference concluded unanimously that this did not violate the Geneva agreements,⁷ the aid agreement itself testi-

fies that Cambodia at that time looked to the West for protection of its independence. Yet ten years later, in May, 1965, Cambodia broke diplomatic relations with the United States. It is instructive to examine how this great shift has come about.

Cambodians argue that their "disillusionment" with the United States is a direct result of American actions over the past decade. For instance, Cambodians believe that, in 1958, an attempted coup d'état was planned and supported by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, and they claim to have a letter from President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the leader of the coup, Dap Chuon, offering American recognition and aid if it succeeded.⁸ Part of the plan was an attempt on Sihanouk's life; a bomb which arrived through the mails killed the two palace servants who opened it.

U. S. ALLIES

Fundamental to Cambodian antagonism for the United States is the fact that the governments of both its neighboring traditional enemies are today firmly allied to the United States. While in 1950 a threat to Cambodia might have come from a Vietnam that everyone at Geneva assumed would be communist, today it comes from a South Vietnam, or more particularly a Thailand, that enjoys the closest ties with the United States. Since both these countries have massive armies supplied with American equipment and "advisors" (Thailand counts about 130,000 men, Saigon about 300,000; Cambodia has 33,500 men in its combined armed forces), Cambodians therefore see the United States as partially responsible for this double threat.

Unfortunately, the United States has been less than diplomatic in ignoring Cambodian claims against her neighbors. In 1961, Sihanouk said the following in an interview for *Figaro*:

Vietnam's claims on the small coastal islands of Cambodia appear negligible in a (world policy) conceived in Washington, as does the episode of Preah Vihear (the temple returned to Cambodia by World Court decision in 1962). . . . Since the "friends of our enemies are our enemies as well," it is not surprising that Cambodia judges

⁷ *Progress Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia*, No. 3 (London: HMSO Cmd. 9579, 1955), pp. 5-6.

⁸ *Le Sangkum*, No. 2 (September, 1965), p. 18.

Washington's policy by the behavior of its proteges.⁹

Cambodia's mistrust of United States intentions is further compounded by the presence in both South Vietnam and Thailand of an active anti-Sihanouk movement, apparently with the tolerance if not the encouragement of the governments concerned. This movement, known as the Khmer Serei (Free Khmer) and led by Cambodian exiles Son Ngoc Thanh and Sam Sari, calls for the overthrow of the Cambodian government and the abandonment of its "procommunist policies." It broadcasts radio programs in Khmer from both Thailand and South Vietnam, an operation that obviously could be stopped were these governments willing to stop it. Cambodia charges that the radio equipment was provided by American agents and that the exiles have the same sort of support as did Dap Chuon in 1958. The refusal of the United States government to take action against the Khmer Serei (on the grounds that these were matters internal to the states of South Vietnam and Thailand) was the occasion for the rejection of United States aid by Cambodia in November, 1963.

Finally, Cambodia considers the United States military action in Vietnam to be a threat to her internal security and peace. As the American direct involvement increases, the expansion of the war into Cambodia appears ever more imminent to that small country. The "domino theory" works in reverse in this case: the longer the American presence remains in Vietnam, the closer become the relations between Cambodia and

China. When in December, 1965, American field commanders were authorized to fire into and even cross into Cambodian territory "in case of clear self-defense," Cambodian response was to seek stronger guarantees of Chinese protection. In April, 1966, three American jets bombed Kompong Batras, and a helicopter straffed Kompong Trach some days later. Then on July 31 and August 2, Thlok Trach was bombed, inflicting civilian deaths and casualties; American authorities hedged about the attack, and finally expressed regret on August 16. Cambodians are fearful that the incidents presage an escalation of the war in Vietnam into Cambodian territory.¹⁰

CHINESE AID

Faced with what they believe to be a hostile United States, the Cambodians have moved to strengthen their relations with China. Having first exchanged diplomatic recognition in 1958, Cambodia and China signed a treaty of friendship and nonaggression at the end of 1960. Chinese aid has been accepted by Cambodia since 1961, when China offered to build four factories. After its unilateral renunciation of United States aid at the end of 1963, Cambodia turned to China for assistance in military training and arms. However, Cambodia has sought material from all over the world in an attempt to diversify her military-aid portfolio.

Chinese aid to Cambodia, although offered "without strings," has encouraged Cambodia to support Peking's cause in the United Nations and elsewhere. It is clear from Sihanouk's refusal to consider acting as a mediator in Vietnam that Cambodia now supports Peking's "hard line" against negotiations rather than Hanoi's slightly more liberal approach.¹¹

Paradoxically, China, the country most dogmatic in its announced attachment to ideology, is able to maneuver to take advantage of local antagonisms to win friends in its global struggle, while the United States, the country known for the "death of ideology," has remained so intransigently wed to a policy of global anticommunism that it has

⁹ Quoted in Armstrong, *op. cit.*, pp 23-24.

¹⁰ Pentagon statements that military action against Cambodia is justified because of Cambodian support to the N.L.F., in particular by the existence of the "Sihanouk Trail," have been discounted by various authorities in the United States. See for instance Seymour Topping in *The New York Times*, October 14, 1965. See also Stanley Karnow's articles in the *Washington Post*. Prince Sihanouk has invited American journalists to investigate freely the areas where the "Sihanouk Trail" is supposed to exist. See his recent interview with Sam Jaffe of the ABC, published in *Kambuja*, No. 17 (August 15, 1966), pp. 14-18. The interview is an eloquent exposition of the Cambodian view of neutrality.

¹¹ See for example *Le Sangkum*, No. 2 (September, 1965), p. 21.

lost possible friends by ignoring local circumstances!

The rapprochement between Cambodia and China may lead some observers to conclude that Cambodia no longer adheres to a policy of neutrality. This is not true. While disillusioned by American support for South Vietnam and Thailand, Cambodia has attempted to maintain relations with the West by developing ever-closer ties with France. Because Cambodia won its independence without an armed struggle against the French, relations between the two countries have never been ruptured. The Khmer elite feels a strong identification with things French, but even this identification does not adequately explain the tumultuous and ceremoniously splendid reception accorded French President Charles De Gaulle during his recent visit to Cambodia. It exceeded by far the official reception for China's President Liu Shao-chi in 1963. Sihanouk was making it abundantly clear to China that he has no intention of joining its "camp." Increasing trade and cultural relations with Japan indicate the same thing.¹²

Unfortunately for Cambodia, the Soviet Union recently has made it difficult to maintain the cordial relations that have until now existed between the two countries. In the first decade of independence, Cambodia received more aid from the Soviet Union than from any other country but the United States and France.¹³ Since the end of the Khmer-American military-aid agreement, the Cambodian Royal Air Force has obtained several Russian MIG's. On October 8, 1965, however, during a state visit to North Korea, whence he intended to proceed to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Kremlin, Sihanouk received a most cavalier note from

the Russian ambassador cancelling the invitation until a new date could be fixed "through diplomatic channels."¹⁴ This incident, which Cambodians refer to as the "Pyong Yang coup," has soured relations somewhat, suggesting to left-wing Cambodians that the Russians suffer from the same white supremacist disease as the Americans.¹⁵ Sihanouk considers that the Soviet Union has also neglected its duties as cochairman of the Geneva Conference in failing to act on his repeated suggestions that the conference be reconvened.

That Cambodian policies are independent of Peking is clearly demonstrated in its attitude toward the Laotian tangle. In June, 1966, Radio Phnom Penh announced that a spokesman for the Communist Neo Lao Hak-sat (Patriotic Laotian Front) had claimed part of the Cambodian province of Stung Treng as Laotian territory. "The Laotian communists reveal themselves as annexationist candidates whose territorial lust demands all our vigilance," said the statement.¹⁶ It went on to compare these claims with the activities of the Vietminh in 1953-1954, when it sought international recognition for its claim to control part of Cambodia. In contrast, the Laotian prime minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, announced his government's position that the border between Laos and Cambodia had been settled completely and finally before independence and that he made no claims on Stung Treng. Although left-wing Cambodians continually chide Souvanna Phouma privately and in print, there is no doubt that relations between Cambodia and Laos have been improved by this statement.

Recognition of North Vietnam by Cam-

(Continued on page 52)

¹² See *Le Sangkum*, No. 6, p. 19. Japan is today the largest exporter to Cambodia.

¹³ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 123. The figures (in U.S. dollars) on foreign aid for the decade 1955-1964 are the following: U.S., \$310 million; France, \$53 million; Soviet Union, \$49 million; China, \$48 million; aid from all other countries totals less than \$30 million.

¹⁴ *Le Sangkum*, No. 4, p. 31.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁶ *Le Sangkum*, No. 11, p. 27; No. 12, p. 44. See also *The New York Times*, July 27, p. 2.

William E. Willmott was born in Chengtu, China, where he lived until he began his college education in the United States and Canada. During 1962 and 1963 he lived in Cambodia, studying the overseas Chinese community there. He is the author of *The Chinese in Cambodia* (Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 1967).

In Burma, "Why has the military failed in its efforts to unite the nation, give it efficient rule and an improved standard of living?" Raising this question, this observer feels that, "If Burma's revolution is to become a reality, the nation must produce a new citizen who is both technically trained and culturally oriented."

Military Rule in Burma

By JOSEF SILVERSTEIN

Associate Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University

NEARLY FIVE YEARS AGO, General Ne Win awoke the people of Burma with a startling proclamation which began,

I have to inform you that the armed forces of the Union have taken over the responsibility and the task of keeping the country's safety owing to the greatly deteriorating conditions in the Union,

and ended with the promise that "... we shall exert our utmost efforts for the happiness and well-being of all the people of the Union." During the years that followed, the general and the men who seized power with him fashioned a political dictatorship, embarked upon a controlled socio-economic revolution and pursued a course of semi-isolation from the outside world. Today, with Burma only a little closer to popular self-rule than it was following the coup, with internal instability still a major problem, with economic stagnation and decline, it is reasonable to ask why the military—with greater power, with unity among its leaders and with less direct opposition than its civilian predecessors—has proven incapable of uniting the people and giving them efficient rule and an improved standard of living. Only by carefully examining the men, ideas and experiences of the past half-decade can tentative answers be formulated and discussed.

When the armed forces seized power in March, 1962, it was not the first time that its

leaders had held civil authority. As early as 1949, at a time of crisis, General Ne Win entered the cabinet as deputy prime minister and head of several important ministries while continuing to serve as commander of the armed forces. In 1952, the army governed in the Shan State¹ under a proclamation of martial law which remained in effect until August, 1954. The army's authority, under that decree, extended from keeping law and order to helping with the harvest and local education. The record of the military regime was mixed and many Shans were angered by its behavior.

In 1958, because a split in the governing party threatened the stability of the state, General Ne Win took over the prime ministership at the request of Prime Minister U Nu. He formed a caretaker government, maintained law and order and made it possible to hold elections in 1960. During his administration, high military officers assumed responsible civil and economic office and through the use of middle and junior officers carried out their orders with dispatch and, at times, arbitrarily. The popular response was fear and resentment which was demonstrated by voting for the party which separated itself from the caretaker regime. The armed forces retired from government but did not go far away.

For many, both in and out of Burma, the 1962 coup heralded a return of the govern-

¹ A state in eastern Burma.

ernment to firm and experienced hands. Few took notice of the fact that in 1962 only one-half of the 17 members of the Revolutionary Council had held important administrative posts in the caretaker regime. Most observers had forgotten that many of the key senior officers of the earlier military administration had been retired or were suddenly sent abroad in February, 1961, with no evidence that General Ne Win sought their return. By the manner in which the military seized power and by its actions thereafter, it was clear that the coup government was not going to be the same as its predecessor.

THE REVOLUTION'S IDEOLOGY

If the 1962 coup was planned and executed in haste by a few officers and men, it cannot be taken as a representative action of Burma's military. After its reorganization in 1949, the men in charge built their formations, determined their missions and chose their weapons with care and deliberation. Even in combat, they place high value on thorough planning and careful execution. This is not to suggest that they are not also pragmatic and, at times, improvisors; it is only to suggest that they have a high regard for ideas and that, to them, ideology is important as a guide to action. The military intellectuals have given thought and expressed themselves on such questions as the nation's goals, how they are to be achieved and what role the army is to play in accomplishing them. On the eve of assuming power in 1958, they drew up a statement about the nation's ideology—one which found its inspiration in the preamble of the constitution. They held that the nation's first goal was to create a society free of want, based on a political and economic system which incorporated the principles of justice, liberty and equality. To realize these ends, they argued that it was necessary to restore peace and establish the rule of law, build a democratic society and develop a socialist economy. During the caretaker regime, they gave priority to the first of these three tasks and left the other two to their civilian successors.

The ideas of the men who executed the

1962 coup differed from those of the men in the earlier administration. The members of the Revolutionary Council published their own ideological statement in April, 1962, and entitled it the *Burmese Way to Socialism* (B.W.S.). It has been their guide to action ever since, even though they have poured new content into their original ideas. In the B.W.S. the theorists reversed the priorities established by their military predecessors. They argued that Burma's problems were the result of the economic system—that the remnants of a capitalist-colonial system corrupted society, as well as its individual members, and contributed to national disunity and social unrest. Parliamentary democracy, they continued, had also contributed to the nation's problems; as a system based on conflict, it added to national disharmony and its institutions were misused for personal gain by those in power. Thus, they concluded, it was necessary to give first priority to changing the economic system and to construct a new political system in keeping with the needs and traditions of Burma. The document was too general to give specific directions for accomplishing the tasks; it was the intention of the theorists to produce a series of statements which would come to grips with the problems of how to realize the broad goals they had set. In mid-January, 1963, they produced a second statement, *The Philosophy of the Burma Socialist Program Party*, which attempted to define the relationship of man to his environment and to relate his religious and social values to his behavior. To date, no other documents have appeared; the gaps in theory have been filled by pragmatic action.

A NEW STRUCTURE

Along with the changes in men and ideas, there were significant alterations in the structure of government. The earlier caretaker regime, which was committed to constitutionalism, worked within the framework of the existing institutions. Parliament met, Ne Win reported to it, and the parties continued to function and plan for the future election when power would be returned to civil rule. The soldiers-in-power overhauled the admin-

istration and staffed it with some of Burma's ablest officers and empowered them to act directly on problems in their sectors of responsibility. In areas of insurgency, security councils of soldiers, bureaucrats and police were formed to take responsibility for security and administration. The paramilitary Union Military Police was reorganized as the Union Constabulary and given a reduced role in government. Toward the end of the regime, certain areas on Burma's frontier were removed from the control of the states and placed under a military-dominated organization—the Frontier Areas Administration.

The Revolutionary Council dispensed with all the trappings of constitutionalism. It dismissed parliament, arrested members of the government and selected political leaders, retired the high and supreme courts and reorganized the administration; and disbanded the Union Constabulary. All power was concentrated in the hands of the Revolutionary Council of 17—all military officers—with General Ne Win as chairman. The council's membership has changed very little since its inception. All but one of the ministries was given to senior military officers—foreign affairs being the exception. The major administrative innovation was the creation of an administrative hierarchy with authority centered in Rangoon. Using the security council concept devised in the earlier regime, the soldiers created a network which extended throughout the nation. In the states, trusted local leaders were permitted to form supreme councils, ostensibly to oversee state matters, but real power rested with the security councils (S.A.C.'s) and Rangoon. Through the use of military power and the financial resources of the nation, the military government was able to make its authority felt in those areas which were held securely by the government. A new system of courts was created which worked within the framework of the old judicial system but made its rulings on the basis of new decrees and the stated goals of the revolutionary government.

To communicate with the people, the mili-

tary sought first to work through the political parties. However, when it encountered resistance from the party leaders, the coup government abandoned the idea in favor of creating a party of its own. The military also used direct means to get its ideas across; by going to the countryside, conducting seminars, bringing workers and peasants to the capital and controlling the radio and the press, it has built a communications network with the people.

Ultimately, certainly by Peasants Day 1967,² the coup government intends to bring a new political system into being. For the last three years, it has spoken of and planned for the creation of peasant and worker councils as the basic units of democracy under the new system. In theory, members of the two classes would choose their leaders from among their immediate neighbors. In practice, the coup leaders intend to see that control of the new councils rests in the hands of *Lanzin* (Burma Socialist Program Party) members who are presently being trained for this task. When the councils come into existence, they will be linked vertically to the central government. Once the councils are functioning, the S.A.C.'s will concentrate upon maintaining security and performing necessary administrative functions. The planners of the new political system hope that it will produce a new generation of leaders who will be wedded to the ideals of the revolution and will carry them on after the military has retired from government.

The military permits minor criticism. With the press under government control, the people are permitted to write to the editor, to register their complaints and make suggestions for change. This is thought to be safe, as it reflects individual and not mass activity and it permits the government to learn how the people feel at any given time. Recently, the government released former Prime Minister U Nu and the leader of the defunct A.F.P.F.L.,³ U Ba Swe. Whether this indicates that the military now feels so secure that it no longer fears opposition leaders such as these, or that it was necessary to make a gesture to show that the government is

² March 2, 1967.

³ Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League.

humane and forgiving, is not clear. What is certain is the fact that, in areas of Burma under military control, it governs with determination and does not hesitate to use force. The people seem to tolerate it, but there is very little evidence that they accept it in the way they accepted the previous elected regimes.

LANZIN

When the military rulers decided in mid-July, 1962, to create their own party, they were not without experience in this field. During the caretaker regime, they had created a nonpolitical organization which they hoped would transcend ethnic, social, religious and political differences. Their National Solidarity Association (N.S.A.) was open to military personnel and civilians alike. As a secular moralist movement, it was dedicated to building a national consciousness among the people, uniting them behind the government in its fight against insurgency, building respect for the constitution and encouraging self-reliance. The leadership was divided between civilian and military officials; party officials were barred. At its first national convention, N.S.A. approved a resolution which adopted the military's version of the national ideology as its own. Despite the publicity and resources at its disposal, the movement never took root. The most likely reasons for this were the government's prohibitions against converting itself into a political party to seek power and its close identification with the caretaker government. Following the transfer of government back to the civilian leaders in 1960, the N.S.A. lost membership and became a preserve of retired military personnel.

When the Revolutionary Council decided to create a political party, it ignored the still-existent N.S.A. and chose, instead, to begin afresh with a genuinely political organization. The military began its efforts by drawing up the new party's constitution, naming the central organizing and disciplinary committees from members of its own ranks and writing ideological documents for use in training candidates. In March, 1963, the

party began to recruit both from military personnel and civilians. By the end of 1965, the party secretary-general reported that there were 20 full members, 99,638 candidates and 167,447 sympathizers. The small numbers reflected the coup leaders' desire to make the party an elite organization with members who had been carefully screened, indoctrinated and trained before full admission. Organized in cadres, the hierarchy is bound together by the principle of democratic centralism and the member candidates are given special training at a regime-run central school of political science.

So far, the party has played no independent role. It is closely supervised and checked by the men in power and its ranks are heavily loaded with soldiers. It has performed auxiliary tasks, such as helping when a new decree is pronounced and requires immediate action. It is presently training its members for leadership roles in the proposed peasant and worker councils. Its success there will depend upon the ability of its members to win the support and trust of the people; this will not be an easy task since the party is so much the product of the coup and, as yet, commands no respect as an independent voice. Ultimately, it is to provide leaders for the national government, permitting the uniformed leaders to return to their barracks. With all other political-type organizations outlawed, the *Lanzin* has no rivals in its efforts to win popular backing. However, the Burmese have an independent tradition in which they have created their own parties and have chosen their own leaders; with memories of the past still vivid, it is not certain that the *Lanzin* will ever lead the people.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION

The coup intended that certain political and administrative reforms would help get at the major targets of the revolution—the transformation of the economy from capitalism to socialism and the remolding of society along the ethical lines suggested in the ideology. The initial target in the economic revolution was the elimination of foreign

firms. Only a handful existed in 1963 and they were eliminated gradually after the decree in February of that year which nationalized the banks, and successive pronouncements which ended joint venture between foreign firms and the government, as well as private foreign activity. All these actions were popular with the people, were relatively easy to implement, and caused a minimum of dislocation and hardship.

The second target—the elimination of the middle class and the domestic private sector of trade and commerce—was more difficult and the efforts to achieve it had more damaging results. In February, 1963, a new economic policy decreed that the government would take over the functions of import and export, production and distribution. No new private industry could be started and, eventually, all rice mills would be nationalized. These objectives were not undertaken at once, nor in any logical fashion. During the next three and one-half years, the government acted at irregular intervals, taking over foreign and then domestic trade. In doing so, it replaced the businessmen with government officials and soldiers—men and women untrained and inexperienced in the complex activity of buying, distributing and selling. In 1964, it suddenly introduced currency reforms which demanded the surrender of paper money for new bills and the explanation of any large holdings.

These and other moves brought protests from the middle class, especially local Indians who played an important part in Burma's business life. The government remained adamant and thousands of Indians left Burma permanently. The government's determination to eliminate the private sector produced chaos in trade and business and caused the people to suffer from shortages of basic goods and foodstuffs, black markets and rising unemployment. The army pressed its officers and enlisted men into business activity and backed them with civilian supporters drawn from the *Lanzin* party. But without training and experience, they were ill-equipped to run the nationalized shops. Serious hardship resulted from a breakdown in distribution which

caused the disappearance of such common items as *longyi*s (the common garment of the people), cooking oil and rice. Despite strict enforcement of the law and heavy penalties for hoarding and blackmarketing, the illegal trade could not be eliminated nor could real prices be driven down.

The peasant also suffered from the changes in the economy. Although he enjoyed a privileged position, retaining title to his land and produce, obtaining loans at low interest and favorable terms, and protection from landlords and moneylenders, he found himself dealing with government purchasing agents who were inexperienced and, therefore, incapable of making flexible decisions both in grading and buying his product. More important, he found the same shortages in his village shop as his urban counterpart found in the towns and cities. As a result, he lost his incentive to expand production, despite the urging of the government. When the government, in 1964–1965, lowered the price it would pay for paddy, he shifted to other crops which paid more. Finally, his problems were compounded by bad weather and other natural calamities.

After nearly five years of military rule and controlled economic revolution, Burma's exports are declining, the people's standard of living is falling and the economy, generally, is stagnant. General Ne Win summed up the situation in December, 1965, when he said that the economy was in a mess. However, it was not until September of the next year that the Revolutionary Council altered its course and decreed that several items could be traded privately—thus reversing itself on the question of private enterprise. Whether this decision represented an example of Lenin's "two steps forward and one step back," as the government-controlled press suggested, or the beginning of a full retreat, remains to be seen. Clearly, the military has proven itself less capable of managing the economy than its civilian predecessors.

National unity has been another important goal of the coup government. The military seized power in 1962 partly out of fear that the constitutional leaders were about to

weaken the union by permitting the minorities living on the frontier to secede from the nation. The coup, and the arrest of all minority leaders, prevented the immediate threat of secession; the reorganization of the government further insured the physical unity of the state. But the deeper problem which divided the minorities from the Burman majority was not solved. Since independence in 1948, there has almost always been minority unrest and insurgency. This was compounded by the political revolt of two communist groups and others.

At the time of the coup, dissidents from three ethnic and two political groups were in revolt. The Shans, Kachins and Karens sought autonomy or secession for their people; the two communist groups sought nothing less than political control of Burma. To bring an end to all these threats, the military leaders offered amnesty to the rebels and invited each group to send representatives to Rangoon to discuss ways and means of bringing the revolt to a permanent end. Discussion began in the summer of 1963 and lasted to the end of November when it was broken off because no acceptable agreement could be reached. Warfare resumed and continues to this day. One positive result occurred in 1964; a group of Karen dissidents returned to society on the condition that political changes regarding their state eventually would be made. Although the fighting continues, there is little evidence that it will produce a solution. The army is weaker than it was before the coup because some of its ablest leaders are busy running the government; resources have been drained away from the military to the civil sector of the nation. Finally, Burma's border with Thailand provides a haven for many of the rebels and a convenient source of supply.

The government employs other means to achieve national unity. It has given great attention to making the minorities feel that they are a part of the nation and to acquainting the Burman majority with the culture and traditions of the minorities. In addition, it has invested additional funds in all the states to raise the standard of living there. All this represents a new start in making the various

peoples conscious of each other and in finding ways to bridge the gap that separates them. However, so long as the military holds the natural leaders of the minorities as prisoners, no real and lasting progress can be made.

Education is the ultimate vehicle for changing Burma. The military is well aware of this and has given it primary attention. In 1966, it promulgated a new education act which seeks a unified system from kindergarten to university; the students will be taught to understand Burmese socialism and how to make it a reality; they also will be trained—either in a vocation or for scientific or professional work, depending on their capacities—and all will be given a sound general education. The university has been expanded and decentralized. In 1966, all private education was ended and nationalized schools were integrated into the public system. Education for citizenship and not for political activity is the goal and it is hoped that new values and ideas will be transmitted to the school-aged generation and will make the revolution permanent. Finally, emphasis is also being given to adult education and new evening schools are being opened and people encouraged to attend. If Burma's revolution is to become a reality, the nation must produce a new citizen who is both technically trained and culturally oriented. A half-decade is too short to judge how well the military is succeeding in this venture.

BURMA AND THE WORLD

In the area of foreign policy, Burma shows the least change. The present goals are the same as those of previous governments: non-alignment and noninvolvement in the disputes and affairs of other nations. Burma's problems are essentially the same as before: to seek peaceful relations with its immediate neighbors, avoid the wars of South and Southeast Asia and permit no foreign nation to gain too much influence within its borders. Toward China and India, Burma has remained neutral and has offered its good offices in the search for a peaceful solution to their problems. Burma has exchanged

several visits with the leaders of both countries and, in its efforts to alter its economy, has taken firm action with nationals from both without encountering the wrath of either. In addition, Burma has accepted aid and technical assistance from China, supported its membership in the United Nations but has refused to join in its attack on United States involvement in Vietnam.

Toward the West, especially the United States, Burma has remained stiff and formal. Cultural ties between the two have been loosened and Burma has all but closed itself to visitors from America. These and other actions stem from the feeling expressed by the general, shortly after the coup, that United States influence among the people was growing too strong and that it was unhealthy. In September, 1966, he made his first state visit to the United States since seizing power, a visit which seems to have produced no significant change in relations between the two nations.

Toward the war in Vietnam, as suggested above, Burma has taken no sides; however, its territory provided an informal meeting place for representatives of the United States and North Vietnam in January, 1966. Burma's eastern neighbor, Thailand, offers several problems which, to date, are unsolved. Among these, the border issue is the most important; the common border is not fully policed and, given the military's preoccupation with political matters in Burma, it will not be for some time. As noted above, this results in the use, by some of the dissidents from Burma, of Thailand as a base of operations and as a source of weapons supply. The border is also frequently crossed by smugglers who take teak, cattle and jewels out of Burma and into the markets of Thailand. Despite treaties and discussions, the border issue remains unresolved and its consequences grow in importance. Finally, the existence of remnants of the Nationalist Chinese Army, which entered Burma in 1949, remain in the remote border areas and threaten the security of the nation. These Chinese are well trained and armed—many having been rotated out of Burma to Taiwan—they are

engaged in the illegal opium trade, in the minorities' struggle against the Burma government and are an irritant in China-Burma relations. So long as Burma's army is involved in domestic political affairs, it will be incapable of permanently eliminating these trouble spots.

At the outset the question was raised: why has the military failed in its efforts to unite the nation, give it efficient rule and an improved standard of living? Under its earlier rule—the caretaker regime—results were clearer. The revolutionary government, unlike its predecessor, did not attempt to improve an existing system, but deliberately changed it. It introduced great changes without proper preparation, trained personnel or any popular support. Also, the changes were directed against the educated and professional classes and, therefore, the government deprived itself of the assistance of the few in civil society who were capable of making the new system work.

The government's ideology and its behavior are in contradiction. It praises the people and in their name seeks to achieve the revolution but does not seek their advice or even ask if radical measures are desired. Finally, it has assumed the moral pose of being above the people and desiring to lift them up, while it has overthrown the constitution, and imprisoned innocent men and women.

In five years, the military has changed Burma so that it will never be quite the same. Some of the changes, in time, may prove good, but only after they have been assimilated by the people and modified for them.

Before joining the Rutgers University faculty, Josef Silverstein was an assistant professor of government at Wesleyan University. He has visited Burma twice; in 1955–56 as a Ford Fellow and Fulbright pre-doctoral candidate, and in 1961–1962 as a Fulbright Senior Lecturer at Mandalay University. He wrote the Burma section of *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia*, edited by George McTurnan Kahin (2d edition; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964).

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Manila Conference Communique

On October 24 and 25, 1966, leaders of seven Asian and Pacific area nations met in Manila to "consider the conflict in Vietnam and to review their wider purposes" there. Excerpts from the closing communique follow:

Introduction

1. In response to an invitation from the President of the Republic of the Philippines, after consultations with the President of the Republic of Korea and the Prime Ministers of Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam, the leaders of seven nations in the Asian and Pacific region held a summit conference in Manila on Oct. 24 and 25, 1966. . . . The participants were Prime Minister Harold Holt of Australia, President Chung H. Park of the Republic of Korea, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines, Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand, President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States of America, and Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky of the Republic of Vietnam.

Basic Policy

2. The nations represented at this conference are united in their determination that the freedom of South Vietnam be secured, in their resolve for peace, and in their deep concern for the future of Asia and the Pacific. . . .

3. We are united in our determination that the South Vietnamese people shall not be conquered by aggressive force and shall enjoy the inherent right to choose their own way of life and their own form of government. . . .

4. At the same time our united purpose is peace—peace in South Vietnam and in the rest of Asia and the Pacific. Our common commitment is to the defense of the South Vietnamese people. Our sole demand on the leaders of North Vietnam is that they abandon their aggression. We are prepared to pursue any avenue which could lead to a secure and just peace, whether through discussion and negotiation or through reciprocal actions by both sides to reduce the violence.

5. We are united in looking to a peaceful and prosperous future for all of Asia and the Pacific. We have therefore set forth in a separate declaration a statement of the principles that guide our common actions in this wider sphere.

6. Actions taken in pursuance of the policies herein stated shall be in accordance with our respective constitutional processes.

Progress and Programs in South Vietnam

THE MILITARY EFFORT

7. The Government of Vietnam described the significant military progress being made against

aggression. It noted with particular gratitude the substantial contribution being made by free world forces.

8. Nonetheless, the leaders noted that the movement of forces from North Vietnam continues at a high rate and that firm military action and free world support continue to be required to meet the threat. . . .

9. In their discussion, the leaders reviewed the problem of prisoners of war. The participants observed that Hanoi has consistently refused to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in the application of the Geneva Conventions, and called on Hanoi to do so. They reaffirmed their determination to comply fully with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims . . . and indicated their willingness to meet under the auspices of the I.C.R.C. or in any appropriate forum to discuss the immediate exchange of prisoners.

PACIFICATION AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

10. The participating governments concentrated particular attention on the accelerating efforts of the Government of Vietnam to forge a social revolution of hope and progress. . . .

11. The Vietnamese leaders stated their intent to train and assign a substantial share of the armed forces to clear-and-hold actions in order to provide a shield behind which a new society can be built.

12. In the field of revolutionary development, measures along the lines developed in the past year and a half will be expanded and intensified. The training of revolutionary development cadres will be improved. More electricity and good water will be provided. More and better schools will be built and staffed. Refugees will be taught new skills. Health and medical facilities will be expanded.

13. The Vietnamese Government declared that it is working out a series of measures to modernize agriculture and to assure the cultivator the fruits of his labor. . . .

14. The Vietnamese leaders emphasized that underlying these measures to build confidence and cooperation among the people there must be popular conviction that honesty, efficiency and social justice form solid cornerstones of the Vietnamese Government's programs.

15. This is a program each of the conferring governments has reason to applaud, recognizing that it opens a brighter hope for the people of Vietnam. Each pledged its continuing assistance. . . .

ECONOMIC STABILITY

16. The conference was told of the success of the Government of Vietnam in controlling the inflation which, if unchecked, could undercut all efforts to bring a more fulfilling life to the Vietnamese people. However, the Vietnamese leaders reaffirmed that only by constant effort could inflation be kept under control. . . .

17. Looking to the long-term future of their richly endowed country, the Vietnamese representatives described their views and plans for the building of an expanded postwar economy.

18. Military installations where appropriate will be converted to this purpose, and plans for this will be included.

19. The conferring nations reaffirmed readiness to extend substantial new efforts to achieve economic stability and their continuing support for Vietnamese progress. . . . At the same time, the participants agreed to appeal to other nations and to international organizations committed to the full and free development of every nation, for further assistance to the Republic of Vietnam.

POLITICAL EVOLUTION

20. The representatives of Vietnam noted that, even as the conference met, steps were being taken to establish a new constitutional system for the Republic of Vietnam through the work of the Constituent Assembly, chosen by so large a proportion of the electorate last month.

21. The Vietnamese representatives stated their expectation that work on the constitution would go forward rapidly and could be completed before the deadline of March, 1967. The constitution will then be promulgated and elections will be held within six months to select a representative government.

22. The Vietnamese Government believes that the democratic process must be strengthened at the local as well as the national level. The Government of Vietnam announced that to this end it will begin holding village and hamlet elections at the beginning of 1967.

23. The Government of Vietnam announced that it is preparing a program of national reconciliation. It declared its determination to open all doors to those Vietnamese who have been misled or coerced into casting their lot with the Vietcong. . . .

24. The other participating nations welcomed the stated expectation of the Vietnamese representatives that work on the constitution will proceed on schedule, and concurred in the conviction of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam that building representative, constitutional government and opening the way for national reconciliation are indispensable to the future of a free Vietnam.

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

25. The participants devoted a major share of their deliberations to peace objectives and the search for a peaceful settlement in South Vietnam. They reviewed in detail the many efforts for peace that have been undertaken, by themselves and other nations, and the actions of the United Nations and of His Holiness the Pope. . . . They noted that Hanoi still showed no sign of taking any step toward peace, either by action or by entering into discussions or negotiations. Nevertheless the participants agreed that the search for peace must continue.

26. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam declared that the Vietnamese people, having suffered the ravages of war for more than two decades, were second to none in their desire for peace. . . .

27. So that their aspirations and position would be clear to their allies at Manila and friends everywhere, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam solemnly stated its views as to the essential elements of peace in Vietnam:

(i) **Cessation of aggression.** . . . The people of South Vietnam ask only that the aggression that threatens their independence and the externally supported terror that threatens their freedom be halted. . . .

(ii) **Preservation of the territorial integrity of South Vietnam.** The people of South Vietnam are defending their own territory against those seeking to obtain by force and terror what they have been unable to accomplish by peaceful means. While sympathizing with the plight of their brothers in the North and while disdaining the regime in the North, the South Vietnamese people have no desire to threaten or harm the people of the North or invade their country.

(iii) **Reunification of Vietnam.** The Government and people of South Vietnam deplore the partition of Vietnam into North and South. But this partition brought about by the Geneva agreements in 1954, however unfortunate and regrettable, will be respected until, by the free choice of all Vietnamese, reunification is achieved.

[iv] **Resolution of internal problems.** The people of South Vietnam seek to resolve their own internal differences and to this end are prepared to engage in a program of national reconciliation. . . .

[v] **Removal of allied military forces.** The people of South Vietnam will ask their allies to remove their forces and evacuate their installations as the military and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn, infiltration ceases, and the level of violence thus subsides.

Effective guarantees. The people of South Vietnam, mindful of their experience since 1954, insist that any negotiations leading to the end of hostilities incorporate . . . international guarantees. . . .

28. The other participating governments reviewed and endorsed these as essential elements of peace and agreed they would act on this basis in close consultation among themselves in regard to settlement of the conflict.

29. In particular, they declared that allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression and its Government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled.

Continuing Consultation

30. All the participants agreed that the value of a meeting among the seven nations had been abundantly demonstrated by the candid and thorough discussions held. It was further agreed that, in addition to the close consultation already maintained through diplomatic channels, there should be regular meetings among their ambassadors in Saigon in association with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. . . .

BOOK REVIEWS

ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE CHANGING FACE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. BY AMRY VANDENBOSCH and RICHARD BUTWELL. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966. 438 pages and index, \$7.50.)

This is an excellent survey of the politics of Southeast Asia. After a brief introductory chapter in which the authors consider the patterns which appear to be emerging in the area, separate chapters are devoted to Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma and Thailand. Each of these chapters is a well-balanced combination of historical background and contemporary political analysis. Great care has been taken to include consideration of the very latest developments. The authors have traveled extensively throughout the area, and the book bears witness to their perceptiveness. The last three chapters deal with the international relations of Southeast Asia and American policy in the region.

Donald E. Smith
University of Pennsylvania

THE DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. BY BERNARD K. GORDON. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966. 201 pages and index, \$4.95 cloth, \$2.45 paper.)

This book is divided into two parts: Part One deals with "Conflicts in Southeast Asian International Politics" and Part Two considers "Cooperation in Southeast Asia." The most interesting material is found in the first part, with chapters devoted to the Philippines' claim to North Borneo, Cambodia's tensions and conflicts with her neighbors, and Indonesia's policy of confrontation with Malaysia. As the author makes clear, he is interested in Southeast Asia as a region, and his study

is concerned with regional conflicts and cooperation. Thus, more serious cases of conflict in which outside powers are involved (e.g. the Vietnamese war) do not come within the purview of his study.

The author describes and analyzes in considerable detail the three cases of conflict mentioned above. While Sukarno's confrontation policy has been the subject of considerable scholarly writing, the other two problems have received much less attention, and the reader will find much information about them here.

D.E.S.

THE FUTURE OF THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. BY LEA E. WILLIAMS. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. 143 pages and index, \$5.50.)

This book has been published for the Council on Foreign Relations in its series "The United States and China in World Affairs." The implication of the situation of the Southeast Asian Chinese for United States policy is thus a primary concern of the author. Professor Williams describes the pattern of Chinese settlement in the area, and analyzes the rapid changes which have taken place in these communities since World War II. The author shows how the advent of independence in these countries has operated to make the overseas Chinese' ties with China—Nationalist and Communist—increasingly tenuous, and has led them to seek political assimilation in their adopted countries.

The policy implication, according to Professor Williams, is that the United States should do what it can to encourage assimilation, but the Chinese in some situations will not be permitted to assimilate, no matter how desperately they desire it. The book is well written, and presents a complicated subject with great clarity. D.E.S.

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INDONESIA'S REGIME

(Continued from page 28)

Jakarta, however, it is the younger officers who have most stoutly backed KAMI demands for a more rapid reduction of Sukarno's influence.

If vested interests within the older military leadership frustrate the promise of economic stabilization, the disaffection of younger officers of both leftist and rightist persuasion will grow. In the long run, the former will constitute the more serious threat to the Suharto regime, for they will eventually coalesce with adherents of the purged left wing of the P.N.I. and the banned P.K.I. But, under the virtual martial law imposed in Central and East Java since the coup, the immediate prospect is for chronic unrest, not the rise of an organized, direct leftist challenge to the regime. Any direct challenge is more likely to come from impatient rightist officers in strategic positions in the capital—a threat which can not be ignored. It thus remains to be seen whether, in 1967, the quasi-military regime of 1966 can continue.

CHANGING MALAYSIA

(Continued from page 35)

dom in Asia, and the indirect part Singapore was playing in delaying implementation of the five-year plan, exacerbated the deep divisions that had led to the initial breakaway. A government official in Kuala Lumpur was quick to point out that eventually Malaysian export products would need to be rechannelled through local ports and should not pass through the hands of "foreign intermediaries." For its part, Singapore has come to accept the view that its interests would best be served by being on friendly terms with all Pacific nations and that therefore Singapore ought not develop special intimacies with regional Asian states. In this spirit of irreconcilability, both governments announced that, after 1967, the common straits

currency and banking institutions would be replaced by individual national arrangements. On both sides, mistrust and fear accentuated the trend towards separatism. The decision to eliminate common monetary institutions was only one symptom of the estrangement between Singapore and Malaysia; a successful merger was becoming an ever-more ephemeral hope.

VIETNAM

(Continued from page 15)

bers, meeting in Moscow, promised North Vietnam \$1 billion in nonrefundable aid,²² and on October 25, using a long-standing American formulation on the very day of the Manila conference, North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong vowed that there would be no sell-out peace in Vietnam: "Never Munich again, in whatever form."

CONCLUSION

There is, then, a dangerous possibility—unless a real step forward is taken by the United States away from sterile and ambiguous statements immediately contradicted by military action on the ground²³—that the next level of the Vietnamese War will involve the nuclear superpowers by sheer accident, if not by design. It is particularly futile to count eternally on the Sino-Soviet dispute as a deterrent to Russian escalation in Southeast Asia: Mao's successors may see China's comparative isolation more clearly; the technocrats now in charge in Moscow may find themselves supplanted by air marshals perfectly willing to bomb South Vietnam "back into the stone age." And, after all, Soviet displeasure does not necessarily have to express itself at its weakest point, in Asia. Berlin or the Elbe may prove strategically far more convenient.

On the American side, also, there are con-

²² *The New York Times*, October 28, 1966.

²³ For an interesting study of past U.S. escalation moves and their coincidence with U.S. peace offers, see Franz Schurmann, *et al.*, *The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam* (New York: Fawcett, 1966).

siderable pressures to the effect that it is militarily and morally (in terms of the morale of the pilots and their families) unfeasible to accept indefinitely very high aircraft and pilot losses while leaving Russian ships free to deliver flak guns and SAM (surface-to-air) missiles to the port of Haiphong, or to leave unscathed the transshipment points of light materiel along the Chinese border. Yet any departure from such policies is likely to recreate overnight the deadly gambit of the worst day of the 1962 Cuban confrontation—the day before Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, in Secretary of State Dean Rusk's words, "blinked."

In both Vietnams, then, 1966 has brought about a certain amount of totally artificial and highly ephemeral "stability"—but it was bought dearly in terms of human and material destruction for all of Vietnam, and American casualties and expense. It was also paid for by an all-around escalation of the tempo of the war and the range of its participants. And that in itself augurs ill for the future chances of a negotiated settlement.

CAMBODIAN NEUTRALITY

(Continued from page 40)

bodia can also be understood in this light. Cambodia has long mistrusted the intentions of Vietnamese communists with regard to its country, for early Vietminh statements clearly indicated that they expected to assume the mantle of power for the whole of French Indochina. The First Indochinese War was fought on that basis, not as a merely Vietnamese war. Until this year, North Vietnam was represented in Cambodia by nothing more than a press representative and a trade mission. Diplomatic recognition of North Vietnam was finally extended by Cambodia in 1965 and an embassy was opened in Phnom Penh in April, 1966. The text published by Cambodia of the talks in September, 1964, between Prince Sihanouk and North

Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong indicates that, at Sihanouk's insistence, the primary question discussed was a final settlement of the Vietnamese-Cambodian border. He pointed out that recognition by his government of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front was a "dangerous position for Cambodia," and he returned again and again to the question of settling the border, particularly with regard to the offshore islands claimed by South Vietnam. It is clear that the renunciation of any Vietnamese claims on Cambodian territory was an essential prior condition for the exchange of diplomatic representatives.¹⁷

In a recent article in a quasi-official publication, Prince Sihanouk has compared the activities of the Khmer Serei today with those of the Khmer Vietminh during the First Indochinese War. Since one of these movements is of the right and one of the left, it is evident that the issue Sihanouk is raising has little to do with communism. Rather, the similarity between the two movements in Cambodian eyes is their close attachment to Vietnamese sources of power and influence. In the case of the Khmer Serei, this is compounded by its reliance on Thailand as well. Cambodians see the major danger to their peaceful development in the regimes next door.

There have been some recent indications that the United States State Department is beginning to recognize this fact. In a news conference at the end of May, 1966, Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed his doubts about the Defense Department's statements concerning Cambodian military aid to the National Liberation Front, stating also that he knew of no evidence of Vietcong in Cambodia.¹⁸ On June 16, *The New York Times* announced that the United States was reviewing its Cambodian policy with a view to improving relations between the two countries. And in August, Dean Rusk complimented Prince Sihanouk for having "done a very constructive and positive job in the development of his own country," all the more noteworthy because Cambodia lies "in an area which is in flames at the present time." Unfortunately, these moves have been paralleled by

¹⁷ *Le Sangkum*, No. 1, pp. 38ff, esp. p. 42.

¹⁸ *The New York Times*, May 28, p. 1. See also note 10 above.

the military actions against Cambodian territory mentioned above. The Cambodian reaction could have been predicted.

One of the few hopeful signs for a Cambodian-American rapprochement is the naming of the "Boulevard Senator Mansfield" in Phnom Penh on July 24, 1966. That our hopes should be reduced to such miniscule signs, in a nation whose friendship for the West—and in particular for the United States—was strong only ten years ago, is indeed unfortunate. That the nation involved is one of the few in the world developing entirely independently, peacefully and somewhat democratically, is a tragedy of American foreign policy.

THAILAND: ITS MEANING

(Continued from page 21)

Not surprisingly, therefore, signs of trouble are now apparent in Thailand's Muslim south; in the border areas just north of Malaya, Thai security forces have had a number of limited engagements with guerrilla units recently.³⁴ It is likely that these groups have liaison not only with communist forces in the northeast, but with the several hundred terrorists who took refuge along the Thai-Malayan border after their defeat in the

³⁴ *The New York Times*, August 18, 1966, carries a report of one such incident among several in recent months.

³⁵ For an excellent introduction, see Willard A. Hanna, *Peninsular Thailand* (Part I: "The Dim Past," and Part II: "The Border Provinces") in American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, *Southeast Asia Series*. Vol. XIII, Nos. 23-24.

³⁶ I have discussed these developments in Part II of my book, *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), and also in "Regionalism and Stability in Southeast Asia," *ORBIS* (Summer, 1966) Vol. X, No. 2, pp. 438-57.

³⁷ It has been widely suggested that A.S.A. and MAPHILINDO could join in a new format, and Thai leaders are not uninterested in such a development. On this subject, I am indebted to Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman for a conversation in New York on October 12, 1966.

³⁸ Her economic growth rate, of approximately 6 per cent, has stayed reasonably well ahead of the population increase, and her hard-currency reserves are so high (\$640 million) that some have begun to complain that her planners are too conservative. Thailand's civil service is deservedly famous for its many highly-trained administrators.

Malayan insurgency a decade ago. This southern area is likely to witness increasing trouble, for its people—even less integrated with Thai society than those in the north-east—already have a fascinating history of secessionist groups.³⁵ The interest that Thai communists and Peking have begun to show in the south suggests that it will become a new front in the effort to bring about the fall of Thailand's government.

III. THAILAND IN ASIA'S POLITICS

Some of the reasons for this communist hope are clear by now, for Bangkok's military cooperation with the United States justifies Thailand, on that score alone, as a target of scorn among communists. But Thailand represents more than a site for bases in the Vietnamese war, for that can be only temporary. More important to Americans in the long run may be Thailand's role in helping to bring about cooperation among Southeast Asian nations, as part of the larger task of achieving long-term stability in Asia.

Much of the credit on this score belongs to Thailand's foreign minister since 1959, Thanat Khoman. Not only was he instrumental in creating the Association of Southeast Asia (A.S.A.), established by the Philippines, Thailand and Malaya in 1961, but he has also served as an intermediary when other Southeast Asian nations have quarreled. He was a friend of both parties in the Philippine challenge to Malaysia's sovereignty over North Borneo, and also in the "confrontation" between Indonesia and Malaysia between 1963 and 1965.³⁶

Recently, Thailand has become a leading supporter of the Asian and Pacific Council, or A.S.P.A.C., a multination group established in 1966. Most interesting are recent signs that Thailand might join with Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia in some variant on "MAPHILINDO"—a group those three created in 1963.³⁷ This is important because Thailand, with her excellent bureaucracy, good economic performance³⁸ and pragmatic approach to regionalism, could prove to be crucial to the success of that concept.

IV. THE THAI-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP

Yet it has to be said that despite her many advantages, Thailand's relative political stability today is not founded upon the firmest ground. While Thailand is famous for the bloodless coup d'état as a way of changing leaders, there are signs that today's ruling military elite must begin to take into account the desire of those who want a more openly competitive political style. In recent years, while much talk has circulated of a new constitution, it has not yet been promulgated. Reportedly, General Praphat and other army leaders feel that Thailand is not yet ready for the elections which would necessarily follow; it is said they fear in particular that communists could mislead the people and do unrealistically well at the polls.

Yet it is precisely the absence of elections, and the inability of local leaders to compete for power openly, that helps to contribute to political frustration and dissatisfaction with the present regime. Ironically, this plays into communist hands—for no group benefits more from the resulting frustration than the communists themselves.

In terms of Thai-United States relations, one consequence is that critics will continue to feel justified in branding Thailand as a military dictatorship, and for that reason an uncertain partner for the United States.³⁹ These criticisms lead in turn to considerable irritation in Bangkok and, in fact, the Thai press has recently printed a letter strikingly critical of the United States.⁴⁰ These upsets follow other Thai complaints, including dissatisfaction with the size of the American aid program, a belief that the United States has been overly friendly to Cambodia (with which Thailand is on very bad terms) and a general fear that United States policies in Laos and Vietnam might eventually sacrifice Thai security needs.

Americans, on the other hand, cannot entirely forget that Thai diplomatic history

shows great flexibility in dealing with great powers. Thus some fear exists that Thai leaders, perhaps not those now at the pinnacle of power, might one day shift from their partnership with the United States in favor of a "neutralist" accommodation with China.

But it has to be said that the Thai-United States partnership is by now so interwoven, and the extent to which Thailand's economy benefits from a good relationship with Washington so great, that such a shift would be extremely difficult to achieve. More important, the present and next generation of Thai leaders seem well aware, as do many other leaders in Asia, that only the United States stands in the way of Chinese ambitions for Southeast Asia. As communist aims are stalled in Vietnam, Peking may become more interested in Thailand. While it will not see exact duplication of what happened in Vietnam, Thailand probably faces more troubles before its situation improves. In this fact lies the best likelihood that Thai-United States relations—however irritating at times to leaders in both capitals—will continue to be good and mutually beneficial.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 50)

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S SECOND FRONT.

By ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. 331 pages and index, \$6.95.)

Since the creation of Malaysia, and the recent upheaval in Indonesia, the Malay-speaking world has been demanding equal international attention with the more spectacular arena of Vietnam. The *Second Front* focuses on the intrigues, disasters, conspiracies and personal rivalries in three former Western possessions which have become independent.

Despite some obvious weaknesses—the footnotes and references suggest excessive reliance on secondary sources—the author has managed to give an excellent full-scale account of the difficult background to the "other" Asian conflict.

René Peritz
Indiana State University

³⁹ As an example, see Alex Campbell, "Is This Something to Fall Back On?" *New Republic*, March 26, 1966, pp. 17–20.

⁴⁰ See A. B. Santos, "Land of Smiles," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 13, 1966, p. 57, for details of that letter.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of November, 1966, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

Nov. 20—Meeting in Kuwait, the Arab League conference votes unanimously to ban all Ford Motor Company and Coca-Cola Company products from Arab nations because of the companies' dealings with Israel.

Asian Development Bank

Nov. 24—The Asian Development Bank opens its first meeting. Takeshi Watanabe of Japan is elected president.

Disarmament

Nov. 13—At the end of a 5-day visit to the U.S.S.R., Canadian External Affairs Minister Paul Martin and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko issue a joint communiqué urging early agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Nov. 3—U. S. Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman talks with French officials and NATO members to clarify U. S. policies. (See also *U. S. Foreign Policy*.)

Nov. 14—NATO's Secretary General Manlio Brosio tells the annual assembly of members of the NATO countries' parliaments and legislatures that the Western alliance has been weakened because of France's partial withdrawal.

Nov. 16—On the second of a 3-day visit to the U.S., Brosio confers with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara.

Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.)

Nov. 5—The O.A.U. meeting in Ethiopia is

opened officially by Emperor Haile Selassie.

Nov. 8—The O.A.U. adopts a resolution demanding that Britain use "any means" to bring down the Rhodesian government led by Prime Minister Ian D. Smith.

Nov. 9—The conference closes.

United Nations

Nov. 1—The General Assembly unanimously endorses the Security Council's recommendation to extend Secretary General U Thant's term until the end of its session.

Nov. 2—The Political Committee of the General Assembly, voting 100 to 1, approves a resolution supporting a treaty to prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The Security Council and General Assembly vote to fill 3 vacancies on the International Court of Justice. Those chosen are Manfred Lachs of Poland, Fouad Ammoun of Lebanon and Charles D. Onyeama of Nigeria.

Nov. 3—The General Assembly and Security Council elect Sture Petren of Sweden and Cesar Bengzon of the Philippines to the International Court of Justice.

Nov. 4—Using its veto for the 104th time, the Soviet Union defeats a Security Council resolution calling on Syria to curb incidents with Israel and asking Israel to cooperate with the U.N. truce organization. (See also *Israel*.)

Nov. 11—A letter of October 19 from Secretary General U Thant to Lord Brockway, chairman of the British Council for Peace in Vietnam, is made public; U Thant urged that the U.S. end bombing North Vietnam.

The General Assembly elects 5 non-permanent members to the Security Council for 2 years: Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia and India.

Nov. 17—The General Assembly adopts a

resolution urging Britain to use force if necessary to remove Rhodesia's white minority government.

Nov. 18—The General Assembly debates the question of admitting Communist China.

Nov. 21—U.S. delegate to the U.N. Arthur J. Goldberg supports an Italian draft resolution to set up a special committee to ask Communist China whether it is ready to abide by the U.N. Charter and whether it is ready to accept U.N. membership. (See also *China, People's Republic of*.)

Nov. 25—The Security Council (14 to 0, 1 abstention) approves a resolution censuring Israel for its attack on the Jordanian village of Es Samu on November 13. (See also *Israel*.)

Nov. 29—By a vote of 57 to 46 (with 17 abstentions) the General Assembly defeats a resolution to replace Nationalist China with Communist China in the U.N.

The Security Council sends a deputation to appeal to U Thant to remain in office.

Nov. 30—U.N. sources report that U Thant is agreeable to a second 5-year term as secretary general if he can exercise creative statesmanship and if the major powers end the U.N.'s financial problems.

War in Vietnam

Nov. 1—U.S. patrol boats sink 35 Vietcong sampans and junks transporting a Vietcong battalion across the Mekong River. U.S. navy helicopters sink 15 sampans.

Vietcong guerrillas with rifles and grenades attack downtown Saigon. At least 8 persons are killed.

Nov. 6—In Vietnam, Major Guy S. Meloy 3d of the U.S. Army describes 8 hours of heavy fighting between U.S. forces and Vietcong troops in a jungle northwest of Saigon 3 days ago. Three companies under his command suffered "heavy losses"; 3, "moderate losses."

Nov. 10—A U.S. spokesman announces that for the first time Vietcong rebels have attacked a U.S. patrol with nonpoisonous gas grenades.

Nov. 19—A military spokesman reports that yesterday U.S. destroyers fired on a radar

installation in North Vietnam, 2 miles north of the demilitarized zone. The destroyers also shelled 12 cargo boats on a nearby beach.

Nov. 23—Two U.S. Navy destroyers attack a convoy of 60 enemy barges carrying military supplies; the destroyers sink or damage 47.

Nov. 29—The South Vietnamese government announces that it and its allies accept the Vietcong proposal for a brief ceasefire at Christmas and during the Western New Year. South Vietnam also suggests the inclusion of the Asian New Year in the cease-fire schedule.

ARGENTINA

Nov. 15—The government of General Juan Carlos Onganía confiscates the assets of all political parties. It is decreed that the electoral courts be dissolved.

AUSTRALIA

Nov. 27—Results of yesterday's elections in Australia give Prime Minister Henry Holt and his coalition government a majority of seats in the House of Representatives. The Holt government supports the U.S. policy in Vietnam.

AUSTRIA

(See *U.S.S.R.*)

BARBADOS

Nov. 30—Barbados becomes independent after 341 years of British rule.

BRAZIL

Nov. 15—Elections for congress and other offices are held.

Nov. 19—Incomplete election returns indicate that the National Renovating Alliance will have a majority of the 409 seats in the chamber of deputies and in the senate. The legislature takes office January 31, 1967.

In Lisbon, former Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek and former Governor of the state of Guanabara Carlos Lacerda announce that they have agreed to form an alliance "of democratic reform" against the

regime of President Humberto Castelo Branco.

BULGARIA

Nov. 14—Bulgarian First Secretary and Premier Todor Zhivkov, speaking at the opening of the party congress attended by Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev, appeals for an international communist conference to handle the Chinese "heresy."

Nov. 15—At the Communist Party congress, Brezhnev, in cautious terms, endorses "the convention of a new international conference of the Communist and workers' parties." Rumanian Communist Party chief Nicolae Ceausescu warns against any action that will deepen the split in communist ranks and affirms his country's intention to further "the unity of the socialist world system."

Nov. 19—The party congress ends. One major action was the enlargement of the central committee and the politburo.

BURUNDI

Nov. 29—The government of 19-year old King Ntare V is overthrown by forces led by Premier Michel Micombero. The King is visiting in the Congo. Micombero announces that the monarchy has been dissolved; he assumes the title of president of the republic.

CANADA

(See also *Intl, Disarmament* and *U.S.S.R.*)

Nov. 29—Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson announces that \$21 million in wheat and flour will be sent to India "in the next few months."

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Nov. 12—At a Peking rally celebrating the centenary of Sun Yat-sen's birth, Premier Chou En-lai declares that the Soviet Union has betrayed the communist revolution. Soviet and East European diplomats walk out. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Nov. 23—*Hsinhua* (Communist Chinese press agency) criticizes the proposal for a U.N. committee to investigate China's atti-

tude toward membership in the U.N. (See also *Intl, U.N.*)

The East Is Red (newspaper of the Red Guard) discloses that on November 16 Red Guards and Peking workers fought for 15 hours, after the Guards invaded a factory to which they had been denied admittance.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Nov. 15—Vladimir Kazan-Komarek, a Czech-born, naturalized U.S. citizen, is jailed on charges of treason en route from Moscow to Paris, when the Soviet Aeroflot plane on which he is traveling makes an emergency stop in Prague.

DENMARK

Nov. 2—Premier Jens Otto Krag resigns. He schedules a general election for November 22.

Nov. 23—Results of yesterday's election show that Premier Krag's Social Democratic Party has won 69 of the 179 parliamentary seats; although a minority, it continues to be the strongest party.

Nov. 26—Efforts to form a coalition government of Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party fail. Krag will head a Social Democratic minority government.

ECUADOR

Nov. 18—Provisional President Otto Arosemena Gomez (chosen on November 16 by the constituent assembly) tries to form a cabinet.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Nov. 6—In state elections in Hesse, the extreme right-wing National Democratic Party wins 8 of the 96 seats in the state parliament.

Nov. 10—The Christian Democratic delegates to the *Bundestag* vote for Kurt Georg Kiesinger (the minister-president of Baden-Württemberg) to succeed Chancellor Ludwig Erhard. The *Bundestag* action makes Erhard a caretaker chancellor until Kiesinger can form a new coalition government. Kiesinger was a member of the National Socialist (Nazi) Party.

Nov. 21—It is reported that in elections yesterday the National Democratic Party won 15 seats in the 204-member Bavarian legislature.

Nov. 24—Kurt Georg Kiesinger releases the verdict of a West German de-Nazification court exonerating him of being an active Nazi.

Nov. 26—Kiesinger and West Berlin Mayor and Socialist leader Willy Brandt announce that they will form a coalition government of the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties. Brandt will serve as vice-chancellor.

Nov. 30—Chancellor Ludwig Erhard resigns; he urges West Germans to support Kiesinger's Christian Democratic-Social Democratic coalition. The Christian Democratic Union's parliamentary group has already endorsed the new government; the Social Democrats must approve it.

GHANA

Nov. 5—At the O.A.U. meeting in Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia announces that Ghana has released the 19 Guineans it seized last week. (See *Guinea, Current History*, December, 1966, p. 371.)

GUINEA

(See also *Ghana*)

Nov. 8—President Sékou Touré orders the expulsion of the U.S. Peace Corps mission.

HUNGARY

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 28—At the opening of the ninth party congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers (Communist) Party, First Secretary Janos Kadar endorses an international communist conference to promote "unity and cohesion."

INDIA

Nov. 1—The state of Punjab is divided into Punjabi Subha and Haryana. Haryana is India's 17th state and was created in response to the Sikhs' demand for a Punjabi-speaking state.

Nov. 7—Within a few days after Home Minister Gulzarilal Nanda extended the

prohibition on the slaughter of cows to all Indian states, an antislaughter demonstration in front of the parliament results in rioting in which at least 4 persons are killed. Some 200,000 persons are dispersed by police using tear gas and guns. The predominantly Hindu population regards the cow as sacred.

Nov. 13—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reorganizes her cabinet; Defense Minister Y. B. Chavan becomes home minister replacing Nanda, who resigned on November 8 following the riots.

Nov. 29—In the Indian parliament, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson is denounced for delaying the signing of a Food for Peace agreement providing emergency grain shipments to India. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy* and *Canada*.)

IRELAND

Nov. 8—Prime Minister Sean F. Lemass announces that he will resign.

Nov. 10—John Mary Lynch is elected prime minister by the *Dáil Éireann*. He names his cabinet.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, U.N., Jordan* and *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 12—An Israeli patrol near Jordan's border is hit by a land mine; 3 soldiers are killed and six are injured.

Nov. 13—Israeli troops battle with Jordanian soldiers 3 miles inside Jordan near Es Samu. Israeli and Jordanian jet planes also clash. At least 125 houses, 1 clinic and 1 school are completely destroyed. Israelis declare that they attacked to retaliate for terrorist activities launched from Jordan's Hebron area.

Nov. 15—Premier Levi Eshkol charges that Syria is responsible for the Israeli attack on Jordan.

Nov. 27—In a statement before the cabinet and broadcast over the state radio, Eshkol criticizes the U.N. vote censuring Israel. He says that Israel will continue to defend itself.

Nov. 29—An Israeli jet downs 2 U.A.R.

MIG-19's that had penetrated 2 to 4 miles inside the Israeli frontier.

JORDAN

(See also *Intl, U.N., Israel and U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 23—In Jordanian Jerusalem, Palestinian Arab students demonstrate against King Hussein.

Jordan accepts King Faisal's offer of 20,000 Saudi Arabian troops to help defend the Jordanian-Israeli border.

Nov. 25—In the "old city" of Jerusalem, Palestinian Arabs, demonstrating against King Hussein, are fired on by police and soldiers. Eleven casualties are reported. The anti-Hussein demonstrations grew out of Palestinian Arab demands for better protection against Israel. The demonstrators support the outlawed Palestine Liberation Organization under Chairman Ahmad Shukairy, which has called for a show of force against the Jordanian government.

Nov. 26—King Hussein decrees that all men in the 18 to 40 age group are eligible to be drafted.

Nov. 28—Premier Wasfi al-Tall charges that "two outside Arab sources" incited the antigovernment riots.

Nov. 29—King Hussein accuses the U.S.S.R. of fomenting tension in the Middle East.

Nov. 30—A U.S. State Department spokesman discloses that Jordan will receive "refurbished" F-104 Starfighter (supersonic jet) planes from the U.S.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Nov. 2—A U.N. command patrol is attacked by North Korean soldiers just south of the demilitarized zone. Six U.S. soldiers and a South Korean are killed. South Korean forces clash with infiltrators along the demilitarized zone.

Nov. 4—At an emergency meeting of the armistice commission, the U.N. Command protests the attacks by North Koreans and warns of war. North Korean Major General Pak Chung Kuk accuses the U.N. of attacking North Korean posts in the demilitarized zone.

LAOS

Nov. 18—Premier Souvanna Phouma announces that General Kong Le, leader of the neutralist faction's army, has resigned. Kong Le asks permission to leave for Indonesia "temporarily for a rest." It is rumored that he was ousted on October 17 by neutralist colonels.

NETHERLANDS, THE

Nov. 21—A 39-day-old cabinet crisis ends; Jelle Zijlstra, the new premier, announces that he has formed an interim cabinet to serve until the February, 1967, general elections.

NEW ZEALAND

Nov. 27—Results of yesterday's election indicate that the ruling National Party—under Prime Minister Keith J. Holyoake—has won a majority of the parliamentary seats.

NIGERIA

Nov. 16—The chief-of-state, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, announces that a constitutional conference has been "adjourned indefinitely."

Nov. 30—Colonel Gowon, in a radio address, warns that secession attempts by any of Nigeria's 4 regions will be met with force.

RHODESIA

(See also *Intl, O.A.U. and U.N.*)

Nov. 11—Rhodesia marks the first anniversary of its unilateral proclamation of independence from Britain.

Nov. 27—After meeting with Rhodesian leaders to discuss Rhodesian independence and the fate of the 4 million Rhodesian blacks, British Commonwealth Secretary Herbert W. Bowden leaves for Britain.

Nov. 29—British Prime Minister Harold Wilson declares that Prime Minister Ian Smith has moved a little toward a compromise that might lead to a legal independence constitution for Rhodesia.

SPAIN

Nov. 22—The *Cortes* approves a new con-

stitution to liberalize the regime proposed by Generalissimo Francisco Franco. On December 14, Spanish voters will vote on it in a referendum. The constitution takes power away from the Falange party.

SYRIA

(See *Intl, U.N.*)

Nov. 3—U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Syrian Premier Yussef Zayen confer in Cairo for 3 hours.

Nov. 4—Syria and the U.A.R. sign a defense pact providing for a joint command of the armed forces.

Nov. 7—Premier Yussef Zayen ends a week's visit to the U.A.R. A joint communiqué declares that the 2 countries will study ways of "building a unified socialist Arab homeland."

TOGO

Nov. 21—An attempted coup is crushed by Togo army troops without any fighting. Yesterday President Nicholas Grunitzky dismissed the cabinet.

Nov. 26—Grunitzky forms a new cabinet.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Nov. 8—Results of yesterday's election (the first since independence in 1962) indicate that Prime Minister Eric Williams' People's National Movement has won 24 of the 36 seats in the house of representatives.

U.S.S.R., THE

Nov. 7—At the 49th anniversary celebration of the Russian revolution, the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky, denounces Chinese policy in the Vietnamese War, i.e., he criticizes its refusal to support a unified effort "by the socialist countries in support of the Vietnamese people." Chang Teh-tsuen, Chinese charge d'affaires, and his military aides walk out. (See also *Bulgaria* and *China, People's Republic of.*)

Nov. 9—Canadian Secretary of External Affairs Paul Martin opens talks on Vietnam with Soviet leaders in Moscow. (See also *Intl, Disarmament.*)

Nov. 14—Soviet President (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) Nikolai V. Podgorny arrives in Austria on an official visit.

Nov. 19—*Tass* (Soviet press agency) warns all airplanes and ships to avoid a Soviet target area in the South Pacific beginning tomorrow, when the U.S.S.R. will begin rocket tests.

Nov. 23—In Moscow, British Foreign Secretary George Brown confers with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. They discuss Vietnam and a nuclear test ban to include underground tests.

Nov. 25—Premier Aleksei Kosygin confers with British Foreign Secretary Brown. Sources report that Brown was unable to win Soviet acceptance of his plan to initiate peace talks on Vietnam.

Nov. 27—Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev arrives in Budapest for the Hungarian Communist Party congress.

Pravda (Communist Party newspaper) publishes an editorial strongly condemning Communist Chinese party chief Mao Tse-tung and charging that Red China's policies are opposed to the "basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. . . ."

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See also *Israel* and *Syria*)

Nov. 6—It is disclosed that on October 14, U.A.R. bomber planes flew a bombing mission against Najran, a Saudi Arabian oasis near the Yemeni border.

Nov. 24—It is reported that U.A.R. customs authorities have seized the assets of a Ford Motor Co. assembly plant in Alexandria and other Ford assets and property. It is rumored that the conflict arises over a dispute as to whether Ford should pay custom duties on cars assembled and sold in the U.A.R.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Rhodesia* and *U.S.S.R.*)

Nov. 10—Speaking before the House of Commons, Prime Minister Harold Wilson an-

nounces Britain's intention to join the Common Market.

Nov. 14—Prince Charles, the Prince of Wales, becomes 18; he is now first in line to succeed to the British throne.

Nov. 15—The Board of Trade announces a trade surplus in October, the first such surplus in 1966.

Nov. 22—The Labour government announces that the wage freeze ending January 1, 1967, will be extended in slightly modified form for another 6 months.

Nov. 30—In a speech before the English Speaking Union, Prime Minister Wilson declares that Britain wishes to cooperate in building Europe economically so that it will be equal in "strength and power" to the U.S.; Europe must not become dominated by American economic interests.

UNITED STATES, THE Civil Rights

Nov. 3—Some 150 Negro clergymen from 20 states and 11 denominations gather at the Statue of Liberty to express concern over "white backlash" and its influence on the elections next week.

Nov. 5—Stokely Carmichael, head of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, is arrested in Selma, Ala. He is charged with trying to incite a riot.

Nov. 19—A pastoral statement adopted yesterday by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops is released; the statement calls for an end to racial, ethnic and religious discrimination and to poverty. Open housing is supported.

Nov. 21—Aubrey James Morell pleads guilty to last June's shooting of James H. Meredith during Meredith's march through Mississippi to encourage voter registration.

Economy

Nov. 2—Secretary Robert C. Weaver of the Department of Housing and Urban Development announces that the ceiling on government-insured mortgages bought by the Federal National Mortgage Association has been raised to \$20,000 on existing homes.

Nov. 4—At his news conference, President Lyndon Johnson is optimistic that "price stability" may be attained. He refers to a Labor Department report announcing that the wholesale price index was down six-tenths of 1 per cent in October.

Nov. 14—The Commerce Department reports that the deficit in the U.S. balance of payments for the third quarter of 1966 was \$217 million (seasonally adjusted).

Nov. 17—According to *The New York Times*, "government housing experts" report that, in October, construction of new dwellings fell to its lowest level in 20 years.

Nov. 18—The General Motors Corporation announces plans to cut automobile production by 8.1 per cent.

Nov. 28—President Johnson releases \$250 million in special funds to the Federal National Mortgage Association to buy mortgages from saving and loan associations and other mortgage lenders.

Nov. 29—President Johnson, at a news conference, reports that federal programs will be cut back in fiscal 1967 by \$5.3 billion; in the next 7 months a \$3 billion savings is expected. Not all the savings will be realized this year. Replying to a query about the effect of the cutback on a tax increase, Johnson asserts that he has no way of knowing "until we have the figures."

Elections

Nov. 7—Congressional, state and local elections are held: at stake are 35 governorships, 35 Senate seats and 435 House seats.

Nov. 8—In some of the key gubernatorial elections, winners are Governor George Romney (R., Michigan); Lurleen Wallace, wife of Governor George C. Wallace (D., Alabama); Claude R. Kirk, Jr., (R., Florida); Spiro T. Agnew (R., Maryland); Lieutenant Governor Raymond P. Shafer (R., Pennsylvania); Governor John Dempsey (D., Connecticut); Governor Nelson Rockefeller (R., New York).

Winners in key Senate races are Attorney General Edward W. Brooke (R., Massachusetts), the first Negro Senator since Reconstruction; Senator Clifford Case (R.,

New Jersey); Senator Robert P. Griffin (R., Michigan); Senator Walter F. Mondale (D., Minnesota); Governor Mark O. Hatfield (R., Oregon); H. H. Baker, Jr. (R., Tennessee).

Nov. 9—Unofficial returns indicate that Republicans gained 3 Senate seats, 47 House seats and 8 governorships, with the Georgia race still undecided. In the House of Representatives, the Democrats have won 243 seats, the Republicans 187. In the Senate, there will be 64 Democrats and 36 Republicans. Republicans now hold 25 governorships.

In Illinois, Republican Charles H. Percy unseats Senator Paul H. Douglas (D.).

In California Ronald Reagan (R.) defeats Governor Edmund G. Brown (D.) In Minnesota Governor Karl F. Rolvaag (D.) is unseated by Harold E. LeVander (R.). Other Republican gubernatorial victors are Winthrop Rockefeller (Arkansas) and Walter J. Hickel (Alaska).

In Georgia, where neither Democratic candidate for Governor Lester G. Maddox nor his Republican opponent Howard H. Calloway received a majority of popular votes, the state legislature will select the governor from the 2 leading candidates, according to a Georgia statute. (See also *Supreme Court.*)

Nov. 11—An Associated Press check, reported by *The New York Times*, shows that the Republicans now control 19 state senates and 23 state lower houses. The Democrats control 29 state senates and 25 lower houses. One state senate and one state house are tied.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, U.N. and War in Vietnam; Czechoslovakia and U.S.S.R.*)

Nov. 2—President Johnson addresses the Korean National Assembly and tells it that South Korea has become "one of the youngest and most vigorous constitutional democracies in the world."

President Johnson returns to Washington, D.C. after his 17-day Asian trip.

Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman visits Italian leaders and Pope Paul VI to inform them about last month's Manila conference.

Nov. 4—At a news conference, President Johnson warns North Vietnam not to interpret the U.S. elections next week as a vote on his Administration's policies.

In Washington, the U.S. and the Soviet Union sign an agreement providing for direct air flights between Moscow and New York.

Nov. 7—While visiting Harvard University, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara is escorted from a student rally in a university police car after student demonstrators lie down in front of his car to prevent it from leaving. He is shouted down when he attempts to answer student questions on Vietnam.

Nov. 9—Harriman confers with King Hassan II of Morocco.

Nov. 10—Some 2,700 Harvard undergraduates send a letter of apology to McNamara.

Nov. 11—Harriman reports on his tour abroad to President Johnson at the LBJ ranch in Texas.

The State Department announces that it has asked Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin for information on a recent Soviet nuclear underground explosion.

Nov. 21—The State Department discloses that it is studying a request from Jordan's King Hussein for "military equipment." (See also *Jordan.*)

Nov. 28—The U.S. State Department announces that diplomatic ties with Hungary and Bulgaria will be raised to the ambassadorial level.

Nov. 29—U.S. officials report that an interim emergency wheat agreement providing 500,000 tons of grain for India will be signed soon. A long term grain agreement is to be worked out. (See also *India.*)

Government

Nov. 1—The Justice Department discloses that X-rays and photographs taken at President John F. Kennedy's autopsy and given

to the Kennedy family have been placed in the National Archives. For 5 years, the records will not be available to scholars and researchers except with the consent of the Kennedy family. No public display or release of the material is to be permitted.

Nov. 2—Richard A. Graham, a member of the Equal Employment Opportunity Committee, is sworn in as the first director of the Teacher Corps.

Nov. 3—President Johnson signs the Demonstrations Cities Bill, providing \$1.3 billion to help rehabilitate slum areas in certain cities. He also signs a \$3.6 billion higher education bill, a \$6.1 billion elementary and secondary school aid bill, the "truth in packaging" bill; a clean waters bill for federal funds to fight water pollution. Over 121 other bills are signed.

Nov. 6—President Johnson announces the appointment of Alan S. Boyd, the under secretary of commerce, as head of the new Department of Transportation.

Nov. 13—President Johnson signs the foreign investors tax bill; it includes a provision for financing presidential campaigns through \$1 voluntary contributions from federal income tax payments.

Nov. 16—At Bethesda Naval Hospital, a team of surgeons removes a benign polyp from President Johnson's throat and repairs a ventral hernia on his abdomen.

Nov. 17—Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower visits convalescent President Johnson. Johnson suggests that Eisenhower tour Asia and other areas on a goodwill mission next spring.

Nov. 19—Sargent Shriver, director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, outlines "Project Keep Moving," to help underprivileged children maintain the educational impetus offered by Project Head Start.

President Johnson returns to the LBJ ranch to recuperate from his surgery.

Nov. 22—As controversy grows over the Warren Commission's report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy (3 years ago today), Republican and Democratic

leaders in the House of Representatives assert their support of the commission's findings.

Nov. 23—*The New York Times* reports that the federal government has ordered regional offices of the Bureau of Public Roads to reduce spending for roads and highways by \$1.1 billion, or 25 per cent.

Representative Adam Clayton Powell (D., New York) fails to appear in New York's State Supreme Court to surrender for a 30-day jail term and to pay a \$500 fine for criminal contempt of court. Powell thus becomes a fugitive from justice and is subject to arrest whenever he appears in New York State.

Labor

Nov. 2—The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, representing 145,000 workers, accepts a new contract with the nation's railroads providing a 5 per cent increase in wages and benefits.

Nov. 14—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. executive council issues a statement reendorsing labor's position on international affairs. Walter Reuther, United Automobile Workers' president, who had requested the foreign policy review, does not attend the meeting because of "business duties." His absence is interpreted as a rebuff to George Meany, president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.

Nov. 16—Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, in a speech at the Catholic University of America, outlines a "policy for youth" that would register every 18-year-old girl and boy for "education, employment, training, or service" for a 2-year period.

Nov. 29—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. announces that union membership increased by 1 million in the last 3 years.

Military

Nov. 5—Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, after conferring with President Johnson at the LBJ ranch, declares that bombing of North Vietnam will not be stepped up.

Nov. 10—McNamara declares, at a news conference, that the Soviet Union has developed and is deploying an antiballistic missile defense system. He reports that he has recommended to President Johnson that the U.S. produce and deploy the submarine-launched Poseidon missile.

Nov. 23—At a press conference at President Johnson's LBJ ranch, McNamara declares that manpower requirements for the armed forces in 1967 will be one-third below the 1966 level.

Politics

(See also *U.S., Elections*)

Nov. 3—Former Vice-President Richard M. Nixon criticizes the Manila conference and U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Nov. 4—Answering Nixon's charge, President Johnson declares that Nixon should not be "out talking about a conference that obviously he is not well prepared on or informed about."

Nov. 20—Governor George Romney (R., Michigan) arriving in Puerto Rico for a vacation declares that the Republican party needs "leadership," not "consensus."

Nov. 21—At a news conference with Rockefeller, who is also in Puerto Rico, Romney declares that their differences over Republican strategy are only "apparent."

Science

Nov. 11—Gemini 12 is launched into orbit with astronauts Captain James A. Lovell, Jr., of the Navy and Major Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., of the Air Force aboard. They successfully rendezvous and dock with an Agena target craft.

Nov. 13—Aldrin leaves the Gemini 12 spaceship for over 2 hours and works successfully in space not suffering the fatigue common to earlier "space workers."

Nov. 15—The Gemini 12 flight ends with a successful splashdown 3 miles from the recovery ship.

Nov. 30—Photographs taken by Lunar Orbiter 2 of the moon's Copernicus crater are released. They are the most spectacular close-ups of the moon to date.

Supreme Court

Nov. 7—The Supreme Court orders a new trial for Fred B. Black, Jr., a business associate of Robert (Bobby) G. Baker, because federal agents had eavesdropped on conversations between Black and his lawyers.

Nov. 14—The Supreme Court refuses to review a ruling by the Maryland Court of Appeals prohibiting public grants to sectarian colleges projecting "a religious 'image'" even if the funds are to be used for nonreligious purposes. The Maryland court at the same time upheld a grant to Hood College because of the looseness of its church ties.

Nov. 21—The Supreme Court grants a stay of a 3-judge federal court decision declaring unconstitutional a Georgia statute requiring the state legislature to choose a governor from the 2 top candidates if neither has received a majority of the vote. The Supreme Court will hear the case on December 5.

URUGUAY

Nov. 28—Incomplete returns from yesterday's election show that the reform plan to replace the rotating presidential system with a single chief executive has been approved. Oscar D. Gestido, retired air force general and member of the Colorado party, is elected president; he is to take office March 1, 1967.

VIETNAM

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

Nov. 19—Premier Nguyen Cao Ky removes the controversial Lieutenant General Dang Van Quang as commander of the IV Corps in the Mekong River delta; he is appointed minister of planning and development.

Nov. 23—It is reported in Saigon that Deputy United States Ambassador William J. Porter will lead an enlarged pacification drive.

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